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INTRODUCTION

Recent contributions to the literature in the fields of economics
and psychology establish that the way in which a problem, question, or
dilemma is presented to individuals may affect their responses. Socalled "framing effects" may result in deviations from what economists
would call a "rational" response to a problem.
The legal literature has recognized the importance of this behavioral law and economics innovation (among others). If people act irrationally because of framing effects, then legal rules designed based
upon the expectation that people will react in an economically rational way to them will not be effective. 2 Indeed, legal rules ought to
be designed with behavioral law and economic insights-including
framing effects-in mind.
But the legal literature has yet to consider the possibility that public perception of different types of regulatory instruments, as influenced by framing effects, may have an impact on instrument choice.
Framing effects may render instruments subject to criticism to which
other, competing instruments are not subject, even if in economic reality-i.e., framing effects to the side-the competing instruments
could be subjected to the same criticism.
In this Article, I argue that framing effects can indeed play a role
in rendering certain regulatory instruments more subject to criticism,
and therefore less viable. As a case study, I use the question of environmental regulatory instrument choice. This focus is appropriate in
light of the gulf between favorable theoretical evaluations of marketbased regulation on the one hand, and generally negative public perceptions of market-based regulation and the suboptimal usage of market-based regulatory instruments on the other. The academic
popularity of market-based regulation has not translated into widespread implementation of market-based instruments. This is the result in large part of successfully organized opposition to market-based
regimes. Opponents of market-based regimes tend to raise two related, but distinct, arguments against them. First, it is often asserted
that market-based regulatory instruments should be rejected because
they give rise to a "right to pollute." Second, opponents argue
1
2
3

See infra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II1.A.
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against market-based regimes on the ground that they wrongly "coin4
modify" the environment.
In reality, virtually all environmental regulatory regimes can
properly be subjected to versions of both these critiques. Nonetheless, the "right to pollute" and "commodification" critiques persist as
effective challenges, particularly to market-based regulatory schemes.
I suggest three frame-related reasons for the critiques' ongoing vitality
with respect to market-based regulation. First, market-based regulations tend to emphasize the role of private actors and to minimize the
role of the government. Second, market-based regulations are seen to
separate pollution from the underlying benefit of the activity that results in pollution generation. Third, market-based regulations are
seen to confer rights upon, rather than to take rights away from,
polluters.
These three factors result in market-based regulatory forms'
heightened susceptibility to the "right to pollute" and "commodification" critiques. In effect, the critiques' applicability is at least in part a
framing effect.
This conclusion is important on two levels. First, with respect to
environmental regulatory instrument choice, understanding the critiques as the results of framing helps to explain continued reliance
upon command-and-control regulation despite widespread endorsement of market-based instruments. It also suggests that changes to
the market-based instruments' frame might reduce framing effects,
thereby making those instruments more palatable.
Second, on a broader level, the analysis with respect to environmental regulation suggests that framing effects may affect instrument
choice in general. Along similar lines, understanding commodification of the environment as at least in part a framing effect may shed
light on the proper scope of the "commodification" critique: when,
exactly, is it wrong for a legal regime to "commodify" what had not
previously been a commodity?
This Article proceeds as follows. First, in Part I, I describe the
contributions of behavioral law and economics literature, and then
focus on the notion of framing effects. In Part II, I provide an overview of the regulatory tools generally available to environmental regulators. In Part III, I elucidate the "right to pollute" and
"commodification" critiques as applied to environmental regulation.
In Part IV, I analyze the economically proper scope of the "right to
pollute" and "commodification" critiques with respect to environmental regulatory instruments.
4

See infra Part III.B.
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In Part V, I first describe the differing frames of various environmental regulatory tools. I then describe how those differing frames
give rise to framing effects that are likely to affect public perception of
and reaction to different regulatory tools. In Part VI, I assess the prospect for refraining as a means to defuse objections to the introduction
of market-based regulation. I conclude by outlining broad lessons
that might be taken, as well as possible avenues for future research.
I.

BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS AND FRAMING EFFEcTs

In this Part, I present an overview of behavioral law and economics. I then focus on one insight of behavioral law and economics:
framing effects.
Basic economic analysis of law rests upon the traditional economic assumption that actors act in their economic self-interest. Empirical evidence indicates, however, that this assumption is in many
cases not justified: human behavior, in other words, diverges from
what pure economic self-interest as a motivation might suggest. 5 Behavioral law and economics seeks to improve the predictive power of
traditional law and economics by incorporating behavioral considerations into the model. 6
Framing effects are one example of an observable behavioral trait
for which the traditional "rational actor" model does not allow. As
expounded by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, the precise way
in which a problem or choice is presented-i.e., its frame-may affect
the decisionmaker's perception of the problem or choice, and ulti7
mately the decisionmaker's preference.
The relevance of framing turns upon another concept critical to
behavioral law and economics: Tversky and Kahneman's groundbreaking work on prospect theory. 8 Prospect theory asserts two funda5 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REv.
205, 207 (2001) (noting that most people "behave like homo sapiens, not like homo
economicus" (citing Richard H. Thaler, From Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens, 14J.
ECON. PERSP., Winter 2000, at 133)); see Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to
Law andEconomics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1476-81 (1998) (identifying and discussing
differences between "homo economicus" and "real people").
6 See, e.g., BEHAViORAL LAW AND ECONOMtcS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000);Jolls et
al., supra note 5, at 1476-81; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv.
1051, 1074-75 (2000).
7 See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 Sci. 453 (1981) (explaining framing effects and their significance to rational-choice theory).
8 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames], in CHOICES, VALUES, AND
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mental ways in which people perceive options differently than the rational actor model would predict. First, people value a loss of a
certain amount more negatively than the positive value they associate
with a gain of the same amount. Second, people tend to overweight
low probabilities and to underweight moderate and high probabilities,
with the latter effect being more pronounced than the former,
The validity of prospect theory suggests the importance of framing. As Tversky and Kahneman explain, if people valued gains and
losses equally and perceived probabilities exactly as they actually are,
then framing would not matter. But, insofar as they do not, "different
frames can lead to different choices." 9 A simple example is that "the
possible outcomes of a gamble can be framed either as gains and
losses relative to the status quo or as asset positions that incorporate
initial wealth."' 0
There are, in effect, two aspects to framing effects: people's natural tendencies in formulating frames-so-called "mental accounting"' '-and the ability of someone who is propounding an option to
present the option-i.e., to frame it-in such a way as to take advantage of framing effects and make the option seem more or less desirable.12 The fact that the frame in which an option is presented may be
FRAMES 1 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, in CHOICES, VALUES, AN)
FRAMES, supra, at 17; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory:
Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra, at 44
(developing an updated version of prospect theory that looks not just at risky prospects, but also at uncertain prospects to predict preferences for those prospects).
9 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7, at 454. Technically, the importance of
framing rests upon the nonlinearity of the perceived value and perceived probability
functions that prospect theory predicts. See id.; see also Richard H. Thaler, Mental
Accounting Matters, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 8, at 241, 244 (noting
as "important features" of Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory with respect to

mental accounting that (i) "[t]he value function is defined over gains and losses relative to some reference point," (ii) "[b]oth the gain and loss functions display diminishing sensitivity," and (iii) the theory respects the concept of loss aversion (emphasis
omitted)).
For discussions of the effects of framing on behavior, see, for example, Eric J.
Johnson et al., Framing,ProbabilityDistortions, and Insurance Decisions, in CHoIcEs, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 8, at 224, 225 (analyzing the effects of possibility assessments and perceptions of loss on consumers' decisions about insurance); Tversky &
Kahneman, supra note 7, at 454-55; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational
Choice and the Framing of Decisions, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 8, at
209, 215-18.
10 Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, supra note 8, at 4.
11 See Thaler, supra note 9, at 248-68.
12 See id. at 245-46 (describing "principles of hedonic framing, that is, the way of
evaluating joint outcomes to maximize utility," and suggesting ways in which market-
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affecting its perception is a
chosen deliberately with an eye toward
context of the possible use of
point to which I return below, in the
3
perceptions.'
inaccurate
economically
correct
to
education
particular types of framing
Tversky and Kahneman identify three
if evaluated under the
that can result in actions that are anomalous
of acts, framing of contingenrational actor model standard: framing
14
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presented independently or in
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17
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13 See infra notes 203-04
453-54.
at
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14 See Tversky & Kahneman,
15 See id. at 454-55.
16 See id. at 456-57.
redefine a "psychological account"-later
17 See id. Kahneman and Tversky
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at
9,
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supra
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as
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See
account.
comprehensive
note 8, at 11. Thaler elucidates:
only
minimal account entails examining
Comparing two options using the
feacommon
their
all
disregarding
the differences between the two options,
a
to
choices
possible
of
consequences
tures. A topical account relates the
decision
the
the context within which
reference level that is determined by
all other factors including
incorporates
account
arises. A comprehensive
outcomes of other probabilistic
current wealth, future earnings, possible
holdings, and so on.
assumes that
While "[elconoinic theory generally
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Choices,
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of
which includes only the direct consequences
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framanother typology of so-called "valence
Other commentators have devised
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See
terms).
options in positive or negative
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The legal literature has recognized the importance of this behavioral law and economics innovation (among others). Commentators
have recognized that if people act irrationally because of framing effects, then legal rules that. are designed to anticipate economically rational responses from societal actors may not function as expected.'3
Other commentators have relied upon framing effects to argue that
societal actors' responses to different types of legal rules may differ
even if the rules are economically indistinguishable. 1 9 And commentators have also recognized that framing effects may influence bargaining undertaken with the potential application of a legal rule
20
lurking in the background.
Absent from the legal literature, however, is analysis of the extent
to which public perception of competing regulatory options-as influenced by how the public is likely to see the options as being framedmight affect the viability of those options. 2' Such an analysis differs
from extant studies involving framing effects insofar as the hypothesis
I advance here suggests that a regulatory regime's framing effects
18 See, e.g., Edward McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspective on Pain
and Suffering Awards, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 6, at 259, 276.
19 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, BehavioralEconomic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules,
in BFAvioRAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 6, at 288, 294-98 (arguing that framing effects may result in a redistributive legal rule having less of a distortional effect
on the work incentives of those benefited and burdened by the rule than a tax rule,
even if the two rules are economically identical).
20 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea BargainingOutside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV.
L. RE'. 2463, 2514-15 (2004) (discussing framing effects on plea bargaining).
21 Cf David A. Dana, A BehavioralEconomic Defense of the PrecautionaryPrinciple,97
Nw. U. L. REv. 1315, 1330 (2003) ("There is little discussion in the behavioral economics literature of what relevance, if any, biases affecting individual choice have in
the context of political decisionmaking and outcomes."); Daryl J. Levinson, Framing
Transactions in ConstitutionalLaw, 11 YALE L.J. 1311, 1314 n.2 (2002) ("This Article
does not explore the connection between the psychology of individual decisionmaking and the law's approach to framing transactions, although the intriguing connection is well worth noticing."). Dana explains the connection between individuals'
cognitive biases and political results. First, politicians will tend to respond to public
opinion, which in turn may be influenced by cognitive biases. Dana, supra, at 1330.
Second, from an interest group perspective, Dana argues that "cognitive biases matter
because they may affect the vigor with which a given interest group mobilizes and how
much it therefore will invest in the political process in order to secure a favorable
outcome." Id. at 1331. In addition, it seems that environmental political entrepreneurs will have an easier, and cheaper, time mobilizing public opinion where it is
possible to feed into cognitive biases. Cf Dale B. Thompson, Political Obstacles to the
Implementation of Emissions Markets: Lessons from RECLAIM, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 645,
664-67 (2000) (describing how "political entrepreneurs" harnessed public opposition
to defeat inclusion of consumer products that caused pollution in a regional pollution permit trading program).
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might have influence even beyond those actors specifically subject to
the particular regime. In this Article, I advance this hypothesis in the
22
context of environmental regulation.
11.

OVERVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY

TooLs

In this Part, I present a brief overview of prevalent environmental
regulatory tools-command-and-control regimes, information-based
regimes, tax-based regimes, and tradable pollution permit regimes.
A command-and-control regime entails the government setting a
23
particular standard with which polluters are obligated to comply.
Most extant command-and-control regulatory regimes establish performance standards, but may require installation of particular technologies where monitoring to determine whether a performance
standard is being met may prove impractical or infeasible. 24 The most
common species of command-and-control regime is technologybased-that is, a command-and-control system under which the government mandates installation of a particular pollution reduction
technology. It is also possible for command-and-control regimes instead to rely upon government-established effluent limitations; the latter form of regime leaves polluters free to decide how to comply with
the mandated maximum effluent standards (whether by installation of
one type of technology or another, or otherwise).
An information-based regime requires polluters to divulge certain information about pollution releases.2 5 In return, polluters remain free to pollute; there is no mandated pollution reduction or
elimination requirement. In effect, the release of information "buys"
the polluter the right to continue to pollute. The rationale underlying information-based regimes is that the release of pollution informa22 See infra Parts IV, V.
23 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution
Allowances and the "PolluterPays" Principle,24 HARV. ENVrL. L. REv. 465, 481 (2000).
24 See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?:Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289,
311 (1998).
25 For example, the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000
& Supp. III 2003), requires manufacturers and processors of chemical substances to
maintain and file records of the chemicals they produce. Id. § 2607(a). The EPA
then compiles all the filings it receives and periodically releases a list of every chemical substance manufactured or processed in the United States. See id. § 2607(b); see
also Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11001-11050 (2000 & Supp. 111 2003) (requiring disclosure of releases of toxic
substances and maintenance of the Toxics Release Inventory).
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tion will give rise to public pressure that will compel firms to reduce
or eliminate pollution.
The remaining environmental regulatory tools-tax-based regimes and tradable pollution permit regimes-fall under the rubric of
"market-based" regulatory devices. The two tools are called "marketbased" because they each envision polluters making economic decisions as to whether and how much to pollute, based upon the effective
market price of pollution. As I explain below, market-based systems
offer the possibility of achieving a desired level of pollution reduction
cost-effectively-i.e., at the lowest possible cost.
Under a tax-based regime, the government sets a tax rate for pollution emissions. Each polluter must pay a tax at that rate for each
unit of pollution that the polluter emits. A tax-based regime imposes
no explicit overall limit on pollution. The system relies upon the costs
of pollution, as imposed through the pollution tax, to create an incentive for pollution reduction. If societal actors act with economic rationality, then actors whose marginal cost of pollution reduction is
greater than the tax will continue to pollute and simply pay the tax;
those whose marginal cost of pollution reduction is lower than the tax
will instead opt to reduce their pollution emissions. In this way, a taxbased system will induce the most cost-effective pollution reduction
steps, and thus tend to achieve overall pollution reduction at the lowest possible cost.
The implementation of a standard tradable pollution permit consists of three basic steps.2 6 First, the government determines an acceptable overall level of pollution for the region 2 7 to be regulated.
The government translates that overall level into an acceptable
amount of pollution emissions over a period of time (usually annually). It then breaks that total amount down into numerous pieces,
and assigns each piece to numerous "pollution permits" or "emissions
allowances." Second, the government allocates the permits among societal actors. Under extant programs, that is generally accomplished
by "grandfathering" the permits, that is, by allocating them at no
charge to preexisting polluters in proportion to each polluter's preexisting pollution record. 28 It is also possible to use an auction as a dis26 See Nash, supra note 23, at 483-85.
27 The use of the word "region" should not be taken to imply that tradable pollution permit regimes cannot apply to regulate pollution of media other than air. To
the contrary, tradable pollution permit regimes have been used to regulate water pollution, for example. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
28 Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275,
284-89.
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tribution mechanism. 2 9 Third, the government allows societal actors
to trade the permits among themselves. Although it is possible to conceive of regimes under which trading might be limited in some way,3 0
most extant regimes allow for unfettered trading within the regulated
3
region. '
Tradable pollution permit regimes seek to achieve pollution reduction at the lowest possible CoSt, 3 2 to increase incentives to develop
new pollution-reduction technologies, and to allocate pollution allowances to those who value them most highly. These goals turn on
the emergence of a robust market for permits, which in turn requires
33
that transaction costs remain relatively low.
First, as to cost-effectiveness, trading allows a firm that can reduce
its pollution emissions relatively cheaply to do so and be rewarded
with excess pollution permits that it can sell. 34 On the other hand, a
firm with a relatively high marginal cost of pollution reduction instead
can choose to purchase permits at less cost.35 Thus, the government's
overall level of pollution reduction is achieved, but at a lower cost
than if the government mandated that each polluter reduced its pollu36
tion proportionately.
Second, a trading regime rewards participants for every marginal
reduction in pollution emissions they can achieve that costs less than
the market price of a permit. 37 Because participants will be willing to
pay for technologies that reduce pollution emissions, there is an in29 The Clean Air Act requires that a few permits be distributed by auction each
year. Clean Air Act § 416(b), (d), 42 U.S.C. § 7651o(b), (d) (2000); see Jonathan
Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: Designing Marketable Permit
Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 584-86 (2001).
30 Indeed, Richard Revesz and I have recommended a system under which trading would be constrained in order to control against unacceptably large concentrations of pollutants at particular locations. See infra note 145.
31 See Nash & Revesz, supra note 29, at 582-614. The Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (or "RECLAIM") sulfur and nitrogen oxides emissions trading program
in the greater Los Angeles metropolitan area does divide the regulated region into
two zones-a coastal zone and an inland zone-with sales of permits allowed within
either zone, but only from the coastal zone to the inland zone and not the other way.
Id. at 611-12.
32 Tradable pollution permit regimes generally do not, although they perhaps
should, include distributional goals. See infra notes 140-47 and accompanying text.
33

See Nash & Revesz, supra note 29, at 631.

34

See Nash, supra note 23, at 485.

35

Id.

36

Id. at 486.

37

See Driesen, supra note 24, at 325.
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centive for companies to develop such technologies.3 8 By contrast,
most extant environmental regulatory regimes employ a commandand-control approach that offers no reward, and therefore little incentive to develop technologies, to-reduce emissions below the regulatory
standard.
Third, a trading regime in theory will allocate pollution permits
to those societal actors who value them most highly. Actors who value
pollution permits highly-presumably because those actors can use
the permits to make more of a profit from productive use of the permits than can other actors-will be willing to pay a premium to obtain
permits; in contrast, actors who value the permits less will be pleased
to accept payment-presumably because they can profit more by selling the permits than by making use of them. In the end, then, the
permits should wind up in the hands of those who value them most
highly.3 9
Tradable pollution permits have become more common in recent years. 40 The most well known regime is the flagship national sulfur dioxide emissions program that Congress enacted under the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.41 Tradable pollution permit re38 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, ReformingEnvironmentalLaw,
37 STA. L. R~v. 1333, 1346 (1985). For a skeptical analysis of this point, see David M.
Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law
Inst.) 10,094 (2003).
39 But see Saul Levnore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 111, 117-18 (2000)
(arguing that, where wealth is distributed inequitably, markets will "not guarantee
that goods will end up where they are most wanted"). At the same time, Levmore by
no means discounts the benefits of markets. He elucidates:
While markets are often advertised as allocating goods to the highest valuing
users, unequal wealth makes this claim contestable. The much more easily
defended claim, and one that is normally advertised, is that markets encourage a larger economic pie, which is likely to find its way to the hands of
many participants, wealthy and impoverished alike. In between is the plausible claim that even with wealth inequality, markets do a good job of encouraging a reasonable level of production of goods; utility is unlikely to be
increased in switching to a scheme in which some non-market force ordered
or contracted for production levels. Finally, even where markets enable
wealthy but relatively low-valuing users to acquire goods, these purchases do
improve the positions of both buyers and sellers.
Id. at 118-19 (footnote omitted).
40 For a general discussion of the rising role over the past thirty years of environmental economics in environmental legal policy, see Wallace E. Oates, From Research to
Policy: The Case of Environmental Economics, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 135.
41 See Clean Air Act, Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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gimes have also been used to regulate water pollution 4 2-indeed, the
Environmental Protection Agency has recently set out guidelines for
states to implement trading programs under the Clean Water Act 4 3 and proposals abound to extend the use of the regimes to help regulate other environmental problems. 44 Tradable pollution permit regimes have also emerged on the international stage: the seeds for a
global trading program to curb greenhouse gas emissions appear in
the Kyoto Protocol. 4 5 Still, command-and-control regulation remains
a common-if not the dominant-form of domestic environmental
regulation; actual implementation of tradable pollution permit re46
gimes lags behind their academic endorsement.

42 See, e.g.,
Robert C. Anderson et al., Cost Savings from the Use of Market Incentives
for Pollution Control, in MARKET-BASED APPROACHES To ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 15,
30-31 (Richard F. Kosobud & Jennifer M. Zimmerman eds., 1997) (discussing water
pollution trading programs).
43 See Water Quality Trading Policy, 68 Fed. Reg. 1608 (Jan. 13, 2003).
44 See, e.g., David Sohn & Madeline Cohen, Note, From Smokestacks to Species: Extending the Tradable Permit Approach from Air Pollution to Habitat Conservation, 15 STAN.
ENvTL. L.J. 405 (1996) (suggesting the use of a tradable pollution permit regime for
habitat conservation to preserve endangered species). But see Lorraine McCarthy,
State Environmental Commissioner Urges Termination of Emissions Trading Program, 33
Env't Rep. (BNA) 2062 (Sept. 20, 2002) (indicating that New Jersey Will discontinue
its intrastate air pollution trading program).
45 See Nash, supra note 23, at 493-96 (citing Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 3d. Sess. U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/19971/
Add. 1 (1998)); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29
CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 111 (2001)..
46 See Robert W. Hahn et al., Environmental Regulation in the 1990s: A Retrospective
Analysis, 27 HARv. ENvrL. L. REv. 377, 404 (2003) ("In reality, market-based policy
instruments are used to implement only a very small fraction of environmental regulation in the United States."); Merrill, supra note 28, at 277; Carol M. Rose, Romans,
Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of PublicProperty in the Information Age, 66 LAW.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 94 (2003) ("Currently, [tradable environmental allowances]
are in force only in very limited spheres, despite the enormous theoretical interest in
them."); Stewart, supranote 45, at 24-25 ("[T] he basic system of command regulation
established in the 1970s, in which environmental problems in different media are
addressed in different, uncoordinated statutes, persists to this day."). But cf. David M.
Driesen, Trading and Its Limits, 14 PENN ST. ENvTL. L. REv. 169, 169 (2006) (noting
that, today, EPA "rarely develops any pollution control program without including
some form of environmental trading within it"); Robert N. Stavins, What Do We Really
Know About Market-Based Approaches to Environmental Policy?: Lessons from Twenty-Five
Years of Experience, in EMISSIONS TRADING 49, 53 (Richard F. Kosobud ed., 2003)
(" [T] here has been an unmistakable shift of the political center toward [market-based
regulation].").
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"RIGHT TO POLLUTE" AND "COMMODIFICATION"

CRITIQUES

My argument that framing effects can influence environmental
regulatory choice rests upon the assertion of two critiques-the "right
to pollute" and "commodification" critiques-to certain forms of environmental regulatory instruments but not others. In this Part, I explicate the two critiques in the context of environmental regulation.
The critiques are generally applied to the market-based regulatory
tools-taxes and tradable pollution permits-with a particular emphasis on the latter. In subsequent parts, I demonstrate that both critiques in fact have applicability in respect of all the environmental
regulatory options I discuss here, and argue that the particular applicability of the critiques to market-based instruments is the result, at
least in part, of framing effects.
A.

The "Right to Pollute" Critique

Many opponents assail tradable pollution permit regimes for creating a "right to pollute." 47 The problem with the government crea47 See James L. Huffman, Markets, Regulation, and Environmental Protection, 55
MONT. L. REv. 425, 432 (1994) ("Most environmental groups have opposed the tradeable emissions approach, generally on the ground that no one should have a right to
pollute."); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Wat Good Is Economics?, 37 U.C. DAVis L. REV.
175, 197 (2003) ("[M]any environmentalists complain that market mechanisms are
mere 'license[s] to pollute' . . . ." (quoting STEVEN P. KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVAES? ECONOMISTS ANt THE ENVIRONMENT 44 (1981))); see also Matthew L. Wald, Utility Is Selling Right to Pollute, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1992, at IA. Barry Commoner applied
the critique, in respect of the proposal for a national sulfur dioxide emission trading
program (which later came to fruition), thus:
This is . . . a perverse parody of the "free market." . .. [1]nstead of goodsuseful things that people want-being exchanged, "bads" that nobody wants
are traded. It is a market that cannot operate unless it is provided with what
it is supposed to exchange-pollutants. This is a proposal that not only fails
to prevent pollution but actually requires it.
BARRY COMMONER, MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLANET 188 (1992).
Steven Kelman provides empirical evidence of the prevalence of the "right to
pollute" view among Democratic Senate staffers and environmentalists in the early
1980s. See Steven Kelman, Economic Incentives and EnvironmentalPolicy: Politics, Ideology,
and Philosophy, in INCENTWES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 291, 303-04, 304
tbl.14.3 (Thomas C. Schelling ed., 1983) (describing Democratic Senate staffers' general adherence to the "right to pollute" critique); id. at 310-11 tbls.14.5 & 14.6; id. at
311 ("Thirty-seven percent of environmentalist respondents mentioned the 'license to
pollute' argument, and those mentioning that argument were also more likely to oppose charges. . . ."); id. at 311-19 (describing the staying power of the critique).
Some commentators suggest that even environmentalists have essentially abandoned the "right to pollute" critique. See, e.g., Jonathan Baert Wiener, GlobalEnvironmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE LJ. 677, 726 (1999)
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by the government; thus, it is possible that actors who are directly subject to government regulation that gives rise to a "right to pollute"
may reduce their pollution (as they are obligated to under the regulation), but that society's overall attitude toward reduction of pollution
is less demanding, with the result that overall pollution in fact
53

increases.

Third, Kelman argues that governmental recognition of a "right
to pollute" would remove an incentive for polluters to reduce their
own pollution: "Stigmatization of polluting behavior will tend to increase compliance with social measures to reduce pollution. Stigmatization may also act to make polluters realize that their behavior shows
insufficient concern for others, thus changing their attitudes and, per54
haps, their resistance to environmental laws."
53

Bruno Frey argues:
The sale of licenses allowing a specific amount of pollution suggests to people that pollution is not morally condemned and that once a license has
been granted, a 'license to pollute' has been acquired. The environmental
decision-makers . . ,fear the destruction of environmentally relevant intrinsic motivation spilling over into those areas where pricing instruments are
not applicable ....People perceive the environment as a whole. Decisionmakers fear that the use of pricing instruments would lead to a counterproductive effect: the quality of the environment is improved in those areas
where tradeable licenses (or environmental charges or taxes) are applied,
but environmental quality is lowered in all other areas because the guiding
environmental ethic has weakened or has been completely destroyed. This
reduced ethic moreover hampers individuals' willingness to accept any kind
of action to fight pollution, i.e., political support for environmental policies
would also be decreased.

Bruno S. Frey, Motivation as a Limit to Pricing,14J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 635, 652 (1993).
The potential for both command-and-control restrictions and ethical motivations
to influence behavior is demonstrated by a sign in the Tulane University main parking
complex elevator, which reads: "COURTESY IS CONTAGIOUS! PLEASE PARK
WITHIN THE LINES. VIOLATORS WILL BE ISSUED CITATIONS!" See also
Charisse Jones, NYC Tackles Cellphone Etiquette: Legislating What's Rude Goes Too Far,
Some Claim, USA TODAY, Oct. 31, 2002, at 3A (discussing proposed New York City
legislation that would have imposed fines on individuals whose cellular telephones
ring during indoor performances).
54 KELMAN, supranote 47, at 52; see generally id. at 52-53 (connecting "the success
of stigmatization with the existence of a sense of social interdependence").
Compare Kelman's argument with the argument advanced in David B. Spence,
The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REv. 917 (2001). Spence argues that the existing environmental regulatory framework relies too heavily on a "rational polluter" presumption-that
is, the presumption that societal actors will pollute to the extent that regulation directs them not to. See id. at 919-31. Spence suggests that many societal actors choose
to reduce their pollution on their own, and that in fact many polluters exceed pollution limits unintentionally-despite extensive and expensive efforts to comply-sim-
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The "Commodification" Critique

Opponents also frequently raise a "commodification" critique of
tradable pollution permit regimes and certain other forms of environmental regulation. 5 5 This complaint argues that tradable pollution
permits render the environment, or environmental quality, a mere
"commodity," and that that "commodification" is wrong. Despite this
general statement of the commodification critique, the critique in fact
arises in different guises and with varying scope.
It is appropriate to begin an elucidation of commodification with
a discussion of commensurability, of which commodification is a special case. 56 Essentially, two items are commensurable if there is a comply because the pollution restrictions established by government are too arcane and
complex for strict compliance reasonably to be expected. See id. at 931-77. Based
upon this, Spence argues that environmental regulation should be modified to take
into account the average polluter's good faith efforts to reduce pollution and to comply with government regulation. See id. at 993-96.
Interestingly, if those who attach import to the stigmatization of pollution emissions for the development of proper social norms are correct, then Spence's argument may suffer from a circularity: Spence argues in effect that the fact that societal
actors will not generally pollute up to the limits of government regulation justifies
moving away from a strict command-and-control regulatory approach. Yet if the critics of market-based regulation are correct, then the persistence of command-and-control regulation is the very reason that societal actors conform to norms of pollution
reduction. If that is so, then while the removal of command-and-control regulation
might in the short run create greater governmental-private sector cooperation toward
pollution reduction, it would likely in the long run lead to far greater pollution as a
result of the removal of both (i) strict limits on pollution emissions and (ii) the resulting anti-pollution norms.
Kelman's argument may also be contrasted by an argument advanced by Timothy
Malloy. See Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by Incentives: Myths, Models, and Micromarkets,
80 TEx. L. REv. 531 (2002). Malloy advances the claim that traditional analyses of
corporate compliance with environmental regulation have assumed, wrongly, that
corporate decisionmaking is monolithic. Id. at 544-49. Malloy argues to the contrary
that environmental decisionmaking within the corporate form is generally far more
complex and will depend upon exactly how the decisionmaking authority is vested
within the corporate structure. Id. at 592-600. As such, the effect of external factors,
including social norms, on corporate environmental compliance decisions may depend upon which individuals and/or divisions within a corporation are actually called
upon to make those decisions. Id. at 556-65.
55 KELMAN, supra note 47, at 44 (noting that environmental incentives are seen by
opponents as granting "an unacceptable 'license to pollute'").
56 See Frederick Schauer, Instrumental Commensurability, 146 U. PA. L. Rv. 1215,
1215 n.3 (1998) ("The debates about commodification plainly are related to the debates about commensurability.... For instance, a belief in universal commodification
would presuppose the validity of commensurability. More reasonably, one could believe that all values or reasons are reducible to a common metric of utility, pleasure,
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mon metric according to which they can be ranked relative to one
7
another; the two items are incommensurable if that is not the case.,
Commodification is a type of commensurability. The fact that
something has been "commodified" means that it has been rendered
property-like, and subject to market-like transactions. 5 The commodified thing necessarily then is commensurable with other things
like it, insofar as the things can be (effectively or literally) bought and
sold for money; thus, dollar value provides the common metric that
commensurability requires. In effect, the commodified thing is rendered, like the money for which it can be traded, fungible. 59
But commodification goes beyond commensurability: Propertylike features and market-like transactions are not required for commensurability, but are critical to commodification. Margaret Radin
elucidates the concept of commodification, suggesting two constructions of the term "commodification," one narrow and the other
broad. The narrow conception of commodification "describes actual
buying and selling (or legally permitted buying and selling) of something."60 The broad conception includes "not only actual buying and
selling, but also market rhetoric, the practice of thinking about interactions as if they were sale transactions, and market methodology, the
61
use of monetary cost-benefit analysis to judge these interactions."
self-expression, virtue, or something else, but are not reducible to a common metric
of a medium of exchange." (citations omitted)).
57 See MARGARETJANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 118 (1996) ("By commensurability, I mean that values of things can be arrayed as a function of one continuous
variable, or can be linearly ranked."); Matthew Adler, Law and Incommensurability: Introduction, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1169, 1170 (1998) ("Roughly speaking, 'incommensurability' means the absence of a scale or metric."); Cass R. Sunstein, Incomrmensurability
and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 779, 796 (1994) ("Incommensurability occurs
when the relevant goods cannot be aligned along a single metric without doing violence to our considered judgments about how these goods are best characterized."
(emphasis omitted)). The term's precise definition is open to some debate. See, e.g.,
Adler, supra,at 1170 (discussing three related, but distinct, definitions of incommensurability of options); Sunstein, supra, at 795-99 (describing the contours of the
term); cf. id. at 798 (distinguishing commensurability from compatibility). The concept of "incommensurability" has been the subject of considerable academic attention. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra; Symposium, Law and Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L.
REv. 1169 (1998).
58 See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1855
(1987) (defining "commodified" as something "deemed suitable for trade in a laissezfaire market").
59 See infra note 63 (discussing the link between commodification and
fungibility).
60 Radin, supra note 58, at 1859.
61 Id.
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Kelman offers the most thorough treatment of the problems that
supposedly arise from commodification of the environment. Kelman
identifies two "psychological costs of using the market" to regulate environmental protection: the "feeling-falloff effect" 65 and the
"downvaluation effect." 66 With respect to the feeling-falloff effect, Kelman first argues that the necessarily impersonal nature of market
transactions will tend to decrease the value of human interactions.
This will have the effect, he continues, of decreasing feeling-inducing
behaviors-such as altruism and spontaneity6 7-and increasing feelings of loneliness and distrust.6 8
Kelman identifies three essential reasons for the downvaluation
effect of markets. First, the feeling-falloff effect itself results in a loss
of value. 69 Second, goods that are not subjected to market transactions because of a perception that they should be shared equally lose
that status when markets are introduced.7 0 Third, Kelman notes that
benefit analysis) that some-but not all, see infra note 66-criticize, see Edmund L.
Andrews, New Scale for Toting Up Lost Freedom vs. Security Would Measure in Dollars, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, at AI3 ("In an unusual twist on cost-benefit analysis, an economic tool that conservatives have often used to attack environmental regulation, top
advisers to President Bush want to weigh the benefits of tighter domestic security
against the 'costs' of lost privacy and freedom.").
65 See KELMAN, supra note 47, at 57-69.
66 See id. at 69-77. Sometimes, however, commodification actually might make
people realize how valuable something really is-either because the market value is
higher than what people might have anticipated, or because of the realization that
the market value does not in fact capture the item's true worth. Thus, for example,
consumer advocate and former Green Party presidential candidate Ralph Nader supports a proposal to monetize the benefit of certain freedoms in order to determine
whether the new antiterrorism security measures that would necessitate the loss of
those freedoms are justified:
"As long as they're going to deal with monetary evaluations, I told them they
should start asking about the cost of destroying democracy," said Mr. Nader,
who lobbied Mitchell E. Daniels Jr., the [White House] budget office director, on the issue. "If the value assigned to civil rights and privacy is zero, the
natural thing to do is just wipe them out."
Andrews, supra note 64.
67 See KFLMAN, supra note 47, at 62-69; cf. William E. Nelson, Two Models of Welfare: Private Charity Versus Public Duty, 7 S. CAL. INTERDisc. L.J. 295, 315 (1998) (suggesting that the shift over the last century to a centralized, government-dominated
approach for dealing with the poor in the United States has resulted in a decrease in
charitable giving but allowing more time to pursue careers and expanding businesses
by propounding the understanding that it is now the government's responsibility to
care for the poor).
68 See KELMAN, supra note 47, at 60-62.
69 See id. at 70-71.
70 See id. at 71.
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"one is able to proclaim the special value of something simply by keeping it outside the system of markets and prices of which most valued
things form a part;" 7 1 to subject such goods to market transactions
72
would cause an inherent downvaluation.
With an understanding of why critics see commodification of the
environment as problematic, I turn to the question of what exactly
constitutes commodification of the environment. To some, commodification of the environment entails simply engaging in activities
that require one to assign values to the environment. As her elucidation of the broad conception of commodification reflects, Radin understands cost-benefit analysis to fall within the purview of
commodification, broadly construed .7 3 Indeed, since "[m]arket
methodology includes a cost-benefit analysis," 74 "a healthful environment" can constitute a commodity under Radin's conception of "universal commodification.."7 5 Elizabeth Anderson similarly sees costbenefit analyses undertaken in respect of environmental protection as
an example of commodification of the environment.7 6 Steven Kelman sees the introduction of a tax-based environmental regulatory regime as commodification of the environment. 77 And Radin notes
Kelman's criticism of tax-based environmental regulation 78 in the context of equating "commodification" with the "[m]onetization .

.

. of

clean air and water."7 9 Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling also endorse this view, characterizing cost-benefit analysis as "involv[ing] the
creation of artificial markets for things-like good health, long life,
and clean air-that are not bought and sold."8 0 Thus, the broadest
71 Id.
72 See id. at 71-77; cf RADIN, supra note 57, at 120 ('The idea of fungibility, even
without commensurability, still undermines the notion of individual uniqueness.");
Holly Doremus, The Special Importance of Ordinary Places, 23 ENVIRONS ENVT-L. L. &
PoL'V J. 3 (2000) (arguing that the only way to safeguard nature is to protect and
preserve ordinary places and things).
73 See supra text accompanying note 61.
74 Radin, supra note 58, at 1861.
75 Id. at 1860.
76 See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMics 203-10 (1993); see
also Katharine K. Baker, Consorting with Forests: Rethinking Our Relationship to Natural
Resources and How We Should Value Their Loss, 22 ECOLOcY L.Q. 677, 679 n.10 (1995)
(using the term "commodification" to refer to the "process of characterizing and placing a dollar figure upon a good or value that is not generally marketable").
77 See KELMAN, supra note 47, at 54-83.
78 Radin, supra note 58, at 1857 n.36.
79 Id. at 1857.
80 Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1553, 1562 (2002). But see Lewis A. Kornhauser, OnJustifying Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29J. LECAL STui). 1037, 1048 (2000) ("[T]he
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Thus, the commodification critique applies generally to marketbased forms of regulation-that is, taxes and tradable pollution permits-because those types of regulation rest inherently on some notion of a market for environmental quality. The implicit presumption
is that other environmental regulatory instruments do not rest on any
notion of market, and so are not subject to the commodification critique. Moreover, proponents of the commodification critique acknowledge that tradable pollution permit regimes are more subject to
the critique than tax-based (and, a fortiori, other) regimes. The assumption here is that tradable pollution permit regimes, alone among
environmental regulatory regimes, give rise to alienable propertybased rights in the environment.
IV.

ECONOMIC

REALITY AND THE CRITIQUES

In this Part, I subject both the "right to pollute" and "commodification" critiques to the light of economic reality.
A.

The Economic Reality of the "Right to Pollute" Critique

In this subpart, I explain that, notwithstanding certain common
understandings to the contrary, all environmental regulatory approaches short of complete pollution bans give rise to some form of
"right to pollute." Moreover, all these rights to pollute are, in one way
or another, alienable. Thus, the tendency to focus the "right to pollute" critique against market-based regulatory instruments, and tradable pollution permit regimes in particular, is not grounded in
economic reality.
I begin my analysis by considering tradable pollution permits,
since these are most widely, and most clearly, seen to give rise to
"rights to pollute." Indeed, the tradable pollution permits themselves
seem to embody "rights to pollute" as a property-based entitlement.
It is widely accepted that tradable pollution permits are a form of
property. 85 The common wisdom is that they are property specifically
rights encourages environmental degradation by making polluting activities perrnissible at a price. One can hardly defend such activities by developing an argument
based on consent, for the environment does not have the capacity to consent." (citation omitted)); see also Oates, supranote 40, at 142 (describing Oates' initial response
to J.H. Dales' proposal to implement a tradable pollution permit regime as "skeptic[al]" because of the perception that Dales was "advocating that we effectively put
the environment up for sale"; Oates notes that his perception "was proved wrong").
85 Here, I mean "property" in the traditional sense, not "constitutional property"
subject to the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. Cf Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of ConstitutionalProperty, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 942-94 (2000) (discussing the relationship between traditional notions of property and "constitutional property").
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because they are tradable.8 6 While it is true that alienability is a cornerstone element of property, it turns out that, from a property law
perspective, tradability does not distinguish tradable permits from
other regulatory tools. In fact, many other regulatory tools-including command-and-control regulation, information disclosure regulation, and tax-based regulation-also give rise to property rights.
Tradability separates tradable permits from other regulatory forms
only in that tradability renders tradable permits stand-alone property
rights.
Most observers think of a tradable pollution permit as giving rise
to some form of property right.8 7 One who owns a permit enjoys
86 See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson &J. Bishop Grewell, Property Rights Solutions for the
Global Commons: Bottom-Up or Top-Down?, 10 DuKE ENWTL. L. & POL'v F. 73, 90-91
(1999) (noting that the Los Angeles metropolitan area trading program for smog
precursor emission permits "created ... property rights"); Robert W. Hahn & Gordon
L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA 's Emissions Trading Program,
6 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 143 (1989) ("[R]egulators have defined a set of property rights
and placed minimum restrictions on their use" in structuring tradable emission permit regimes.); Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, ForcingDemocracy, 14 STAN. ENXvTL.
LJ. 300, 308 (1995) ("j.H.] Dales suggested the government create pollution permits
that reflect, in total, a pollution limit set by the government, and then allow firms to
trade the permits as if they were property." (footnote omitted));James E. Krier, Marketable Pollution Allowances, 25 U. ToL. L. Rev. 449, 449-50 (1994) ("[Sulfur dioxide
emission permits] have some essential property-rights characteristics. Chiefly, they
confer entitlements to pollute, and these entitlements are transferable-they may be
bought and sold on the market."); Clare Langley-Hawthorne, An InternationalMarket
for Transferable Gas Emission Permits to Promote Climate Change, 9 FORDHAM ENVrL. L.

REv. 261, 298 (1998) ("The theory of tradable emission permits creates a market for
emission as externalities, and grants a quasi property right to the commons by granting what is, in effect, a license to pollute." (footnote omitted)); Franz Xaver Perrez,
The Efficiency of Cooperation: A Functional Analysis of Sovereignty, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 515, 555 (1998) ("iTlhe creation of tradable pollution rights as proposed in
the academic literature or adopted under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 for
sulfur dioxide emission, is an attempt to create individual property rights." (footnotes
omitted)).
87 Borrowing from Richard Stewart and James Krier, Carol Rose describes tradable pollution permit regimes as creating "hybrid property." See Carol M. Rose, The
Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83
MINN. L. REv. 129, 163-64 (1998) (citing Richard B. Stewart, Privprop, Regprop, and
Beyond, 13 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'x 91, 93 (1990), and Krier, supra note 86, at 449
(footnote omitted)). To similar effect, see also DANIEL H. COLE, POLLUTION AND
PROPERTY 45 (2002); David M. Driesen, What's Property Got to Do with It?, 30 ECOLOGY
L.Q 1003, 1007-10 (2003); Stewart, supra, at 93-94.
The rights to which tradable pollution permit regimes give rise may, or may not,
be subject to the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. See supra note 85. But that is
true as well of "rights" under other environmental regulatory regimes.
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fact that command-and-control regimes do not allow for the alienability of any new property interest simply means that such regimes do not
create new property interests that are separable from preexisting
property interests; it does not mean that these regimes do not convey
a valuable property right.
To see this, consider a traditional command-and-control regime,
under which firms receive permits to emit a pollutant over a given
period of time provided that certain conditions (such as a cap on the
total amount emitted, or the installation of a particular pollution reduction technology) are met. The permits are not tradable. Each
permit inheres in the factory in respect of which it was issued; that is,
if the stock of the company that owns a factory to which a permit has
been issued is sold, the purchaser acquires the right to exploit the
permit. In this case, the permit clearly is a valuable asset to the factory
owner. Indeed, the permit has a value that presumably is amortized in
the overall value of the factory. In other words, a prospective purchaser of the stock of the factory's owner would pay some additional
amount if the factory has an existing permit above what it would pay if
the purchaser would have to expend funds to obtain a new permit."
Thus, the permit constitutes a right that broadens the bundle of property rights that ownership of the factory represents, and it is a right
that enhances the value of that property bundle. 9 4 Viewed from the
perspective of property rights, command-and-control regimes appear
as pollution permit regimes under which the permits are not tradable
erty rights not removed by a prohibition of commercial transactions in parts of bird
legally killed before laws prohibited killing); Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the furisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUNM. L. REV. 1667,
1673-74 (1988) (noting that the Supreme Court's Takings jurisprudence has afforded low constitutional protection to the right of alienability).
93 See Robert W. Hahn & Roger G. Noll, Barriersto Implementing TradableAir Pollution Permits: Problems of Regulatoy Interactions, I YALE J. ON REG. 63, 70 (1983)
("[Gliving a firm a permit to operate a polluting facility if it is in compliance with
regulatory standards conveys a limited property right."). Allowing the permits to be
tradable enhances the value of the permits. See id.; see also id. at 72 ("[Riegulation of
SOx emissions in Los Angeles [through, at the time, non-tradable pollution permits]

has created a new property right-a permit to emit-that is half as valuable as the
compliance costs that have been undertaken to meet existing standards and roughly
ten times as valuable as the short-run efficiency gains to be derived from making permits freely tradable.").
94 Along similar lines, to the extent that the tax code authorizes a corporation
that purchases another corporation to benefit from the purchased corporation's unused net operating losses, see generally I.R.C. § 382 (West 2002 & Supp. 2006) (establishing limits on certain losses following ownership change), one would expect the
sellers of the purchased corporation to have fetched a better price than they would
have if the corporation had no usable net operating losses.
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tivities generate pollution as a necessary byproduct.'0 2 Society has decided-if implicitly-to balance the benefits of the socially productive
activities that result in pollution generation with the costs of the pollution itself. There is, then, some optimal level of pollution-that is, a
level of pollution that maximizes the excess of those benefits above
10°
the costs-and that optimal level of pollution is greater than zero.
On this basis, Eric Posner identifies not a strict anti-pollution norm,
but rather a norm "not to pollute 'too much.' "1

04

The absolute ban

on pollution that a strict anti-pollution norm would mandate is
05
neither realistic nor desirable.'

Once one accepts the undesirability of an absolute pollution ban,
one's focus shifts to the regulatory system's method and extent of allocating pollution rights. From that perspective, tax-based regimes and
tradable pollution permit regimes that rely upon auctions for the initial allocation of permits fare better than other regimes: Those regimes at least charge something for every property right obtained. In
contrast, grandfathering-based tradable permit regimes, commandand-control regimes, and information-based regimes distribute at least
t °6
some property rights free of charge.
102 See Stewart, supra note 50, at 199 ("The laws of physics make (pollution]
residuals an inevitable consequence of human activity. Zero residuals discharge is an
unattainable and undesirable objective.").
103 See Nash, supra note 23, at 523 n.222. Still, there is likely to be great disagreement as to where that optimal level lies, and the question remains as to whether the
government accurately might identify the optimal level. See id. at 525 n.224.
104 Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697,
1735 (1996). Posner elucidates: "Firms are entitled to pollute a bit, especially when
they employ a lot of people and produce valuable goods. But if firms exceed a certain
threshold of pollution, neighbors complain, consumers boycott, and so on." Id.
105 See Strahilevitz, supra note 50, at 1285 ("Nor is it accurate to suggest that in the
absence of a trading system, social norms will necessarily dictate that every pollutant
be banned, Obviously, the public is willing to tolerate some level of pollution and is
unwilling to tolerate a higher level."). It is thus not surprising that pollution control
legislation is not designed to achieve the actual elimination of pollution. See, e.g.,J.B.
Ruhl, How to Kill EndangeredSpecies, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of EndangeredSpecies Act
"HCP"Permits for Real Estate Development, 5 ENVrL. LAw. 345, 349 (1999) ("[T] he
[Clean Water Act) does not leave it that 'the discharge of any pollutant by any person
shall be unlawful,' but rather that such activities are unlawful 'l[except as in compliance with' the terms of the statute." (quoting Clean Water Act, § 301(a), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311 (a) (1994))). At the same time, even if the eradication of pollution is not itself
viable, it can be identified-and indeed is identified in various pollution control statutes-as a societal aspiration. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251 (a) (1) (2000) ("[1]t is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into
the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985 ....
).
106 See Nash, supra note 23, at 509 (" [Slome form of free distribution of pollution
allowances is imbedded (even if not explicitly) in command-and-control regimes.");
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Refer86 VA. L. REv. 1989, 1998 (2000).
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ception results from framing.' 10 Further, an inaccurate normative
perception is something that perhaps can, and, if so should, be
changed, perhaps by public education, a point to which I return
below.III

A final ground on which one might hold out for the propriety of
singling out tradable pollution permit regimes under the "right to pollute" critique is the argument that the "rights to pollute" to which a
tradable permit regime gives rise are especially property-like, and
therefore objectionable, because they are alienable. This argument,
too, proves ultimately unconvincing.
While the common wisdom is that only tradable pollution permit
regimes give rise to rights that are alienable, it is in fact not the case
that tradable pollution permit regimes are the only regimes that give
rise to alienable property rights. To the contrary, the property-based
rights to which other environmental regulatory regimes give rise generally also are alienable: They may be transferred along with the underlying property with which they are associated. Thus, for example,
where a command-and-control regime vests a valuable property right
with a factory, the owner of the factory may sell that right, along with
the factory, to a willing buyer." 12 Note, moreover, that, because the
property right conferred by the command-and-control regime is valuable, the seller will receive more for its factory than it would without
that right. Thus, the factory owner is free to transfer the property
110

See infra Part V.

111

See infra Part VI.

112 Some systems make alienation upon transfer of assets easier than others. See,
e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 122.61(b) (2005) (providing for "[a]utomatic transfers" of National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System permits under the Clean Water Act to new
owners or operators). At the same time, even the Clean Water Act regulation does
empower the Administrator of the EPA to "notify the existing permittee and the proposed new permittee of his or her intent to modify or revoke and reissue the permit."
Id. § 122.61 (b) (3); see id. § 122.41(l)(3) ("This permit is not transferable to any person except after notice to the Director. The Director may require modification or
revocation and reissuance of the permit to change the name of the permittee and
incorporate such other requirements as may be necessary under the Clean Water
Act."); id, § 122.41 (g) ("This permit does not convey any property rights of any sort,
or any exclusive privilege."); Esther Bartfeld, Point-Nonpoint Source Trading: Looking
Beyond Potential Cost Savings, 23 ENVTL. L. 43, 98 n.149 (1993) ("In general, NPDES
permits are not readily transferable.").
For a general discussion of transferability of environmental permits, see Maureen
A. Brennan & Christopher W. Armstrong, Transfer of Environmental Permits in Real Estate Transactions, 716 PLI/CoRP. 87 (1990). The authors note that some permits may
be more difficult to transfer than others, highlighting that state-issued permits may be
subject to greater restraints on transferability.

2o061

FRAMING

EFFECTS AND

REGULATORY

CHOICE

right cannot
is that the property
1 13
right, for value; the only restriction
property
the underlying
be alienated separately from
regimes (short of absolute
Thus, all environmental regulatory
pollute. These rights to pollute,
pollution bans) give rise to rights to
in one way or another.
moreover, are generally alienable,
Critique
The Economic Reality of the "Commodification"
of the various environIn this subpart, I explore the susceptibility critique, in an effort
mental regulatory tools to the "commodification"
which market-based instrumentsto determine the proper extent to
permit systems-should be
including, particularly, tradable pollution
address the argument that tradable
the focus of the critique. First, I
subject to the critique specifipollution permit regimes are properly
property-based rights. I argue
cally because they give rise to alienable
tradable pollution permit regimes
that, as I have established above,
are not unique in that regard.
that tradable pollution permit
Second, I address the argument
bethe "commodification" argument
systems fall inherently subject to
deto
stand-alone fungible rights
cause they necessarily give rise to
two problems with this argument:
grade the environment. There are
as
system need not be structured so
First, a tradable pollution permit
environmental
and second, other
to give rise to purely fungible rights,
generally do, give rise to rights
regulatory regimes can, and in practice
ways.
to pollute that are fungible in certain
market-based environmental
Third, I consider the argument that
susceptible to the "commodifiregulatory instruments are particularly
transactional mindset that such
cation" critique because of the explicit
other environmental regulatory apinstruments develop. I argue that
generally do, incorporate a marketproaches also can, and in practice
B.

Tax Court in Beatty
the opinion of the United States
113 Instructive inthis regard is
issued by
At issue in Beatty was a liquor license
it was
v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 835 (1966).
1959,
in
license
their
petitioners purchased
liquor
the state of Arizona. When the
that
such
law
the
amended
in 1961, the state
freely transferable. Subsequently,
part of a
but could only be transferred "as
tradable,
freely
longer
no
licenses were
836-37.
at
Id.
business and stock in trade."
bona fide bulk sale of the entire
price as
were entitled to a loss for the purchase
they
that
The petitioners argued
rejected
court
The
license.
their
right to alienate
the
a result, inter alia, of the loss of the
change in state law had "not destroyled]"
the
that
concluded
It
this argument.
albeit
exercised,
be
still
"the right of transfer could
right to transfer, reasoning that
trade." Id. at
of the entire business and stock in
sale
bulk
a
only in connection with
amendment, there
noted that, "[s]ince the 1961
841. And, the court specifically
businesses."
licenses through bulk sales of entire
bald] been transfers of [state liquor]
Id. at 838.
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based element-in the form of cost-benefit analysis as performed by
the regulator. I further recognize that the perceived attenuation between cost-benefit analysis and non-market-based environmental tools
serves to confirm the greater applicability of the "commodification"
critique to market-based approaches. At the same time, however, I
suggest (and argue more fully below' 14) that that attenuation may be
to some degree at least a product of framing.
1. Alienability
I begin by addressing the argument that tradable pollution permit regimes are especially and inherently subject to the "commodification" critique because they, alone among regulatory approaches, give
rise to alienable property-based rights. But, as I have discussed above,
other environmental regulatory regimes also give rise to property
rights that are alienable-they are alienable along with the underlying
property of which they are a part. 11 5 On this basis, moreover, a distinction can be drawn between the pollution rights and other items
against which a commodification critique has historically been lodged.
Consider, for example, blood. Blood today is to some degree tradable
as a stand-alone commodity, free and clear of the body from which it
originates. 1 6 Still, blood is not alienable as part of the body, since the
body itself is not alienable.' 17 In this sense, property rights in blood114 See infra Part V.B.2.
115 See supra text accompanying notes 112-13.
116 The development of markets for blood was critiqued in Ric-HARI M. TITMUSS,
THE Girr RELATIONSHIP (1971).
Note that, while blood is alienable as a stand-alone commodity, that is not in
general true about other body parts. See MargaretJane Radin, Property and Personhood,
34 STAN. L. R~v. 957, 966 (1982) (noting that blood and certain other body parts are
alienable, but also that most other body parts are not generally considered to be alienable). On the general topic of alienability of and markets in body parts, see STEPHEN
WILKINSON, BODIES FOR SALE (2003);Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue,
86 VA. L. REv. 163 (2000); see also Heather R. Kolnsberg, An Economic Study: Should We
Sell Human Organs?, 30 INT'L J. Soc. ECON. 1049 (2003) (questioning the long-run
economic benefit of organ selling).
117 To the extent that a system recognizes slavery and transactions involving slaves,
it is possible for a body to be alienable. Even there, however, there is a differencethe body would not be purchased or sold for the blood it contains, and the blood
would not enhance the value of the body being traded. Cf YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 105-13 (2d ed. 1997) (analyzing the question of slaves
as property). Markets for babies-another commodification the advisability of which
commentators have debated, compare, e.g., Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7J. LEGAL STrD. 323 (1978) (advancing the notion
of such markets), with Margaret Jane Radin, What, f Anything, Is Wrong with Baby Sell-
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which arise only once the blood is separated from the body' 18-are
distinct from property rights to which environmental regulation gives
rise-which are alienable along with the underlying property even if
they are not separated from the underlying property.
2.

Fungibility

I now address the view that tradable pollution permit regimes
necessarily generate completely fungible pollution rights and, as such,
are inherently subject to the "commodification" argument. To be
sure, under extant regimes tradable pollution permits are entirely fungible. To appreciate this extreme fungibility, consider the notion that
tradable pollution permits result from the partition of preexisting
property into a base asset and a permit or series of permits. 1t 9 If partitioning provided the entire explanation for the genesis of tradable
pollution permits, then holders of property who received
"grandfathered" permits would hold, if now in distinct pieces of property, the same "bundle of rights" that they held before-or, perhaps
ing?, 26 PAC. L.J. 135 (1995) (questioning the advisability of such markets) -similarly
present a situation inapposite to markets for environmental degradation.
118 SeeJ. E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA, L. REV. 711,
803 (1996) ("[T]he connection of our bodily parts with our bodies shows why they are
not, in general, regarded as our property, even though they are clearly protected by
duties of non-interference, and even though our rights to them are 'alienable,' given
that we can waive a fight to assault, releasing others from these duties, say, to let a
surgeon do a biopsy. Until quite recently, technology did not prompt us to consider
doing without them, much less passing them around. We did not therefore regard
our connection to them as contingent: They could not just as well be someone else's
body parts."); Radin, supra note 116, at 966 (noting that it "seemls] appropriate to
call parts of the body property only after they have been removed from the system"
(footnote omitted)).
119 Note that partitioning is not a necessary part of the genesis of tradable pollution permits. Partitioning will be a necessary part of the process only if, before the
advent of the permits, preexisting property rights were understood to convey to their
holders the right to engage in activities that resulted in pollution. If that is not the
case-for example, if the government decides to authorize activities that previously
were prohibited or if the activities were not previously undertaken (not because they
were prohibited, but perhaps because of insufficient technological support)-then
the tradable pollution permits are completely new property. For example, the government's recent auctions of new broadcast spectra, see Nash, supra note 23, at 507,
can be seen as the generation of new property interests, see, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 73, 75 (1985) (identifying "space on the
spectrum of radio frequencies" as a "'fugitive' resource" that has been "reduced to
property for the first time" (footnote omitted)).
Historically, however, that has not been the case; usually preexisting property
rights accounted for the rights later authorized by pollution permits. In the text, I
focus on that more common setting.
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this, I
design choice. To demonstrate
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generally to use her property
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by
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1 22
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else.
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in theory could be structured in
Pollution permit trading systems
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example, that the government
much the same way. Say, for
actors;
to
permits
wastes by issuing
regulate disposal of hazardous
But cf Anaddition to the holder's estate.
120 This would seem to be a valuable
regulation that
(1979) (establishing that federal
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protection of the Takings
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2006]

FRAMING

EFFECTS

AND

REGULATORY

CHOICE

to dispose of one ton of hazardous
each permit authorizes its holder
tradable. The government might
wastes on its land. The permits are
real property nature of the bunstructure the permits to adhere to the
In this case, each permit would
dle from which they were partitioned.
ton of hazardous wastes on the
authorize its holder to dispose of one
was issued. Thus, if Wally
land in respect of which the permit originally
and then sells that permit (unobtains a permit from the government
new holder of the permit) obtains
used) to Betty, then Betty (as the
hazardous waste on Whiteacre. As
the right to dispose of one ton of
permits, though freely tradable, are
in the lumber example above, the
permit conveys to its holder denot fungible-the right that each
which it was originally issued.
pends upon the land in respect of
permit regimes generBut that is not the way tradable pollution
permits are fungible. Remainally are structured: Tradable pollution
example, each permit would
ing with the hazardous waste disposal
ton of hazardous wastes on any
authorize its holder to dispose of one
sells a permit to Betty and Betty
land that the holder owns. Thus, if Wally
authorizes Betty to dispose of one
owns Blackacre, then the permit
on Blackacre. Under such an ap(additional) ton of hazardous waste
It matters not the source of
proach, all permits are entirely fungible:
rights she obtains by virtue of
the permit that Betty purchases-the
of source.
her purchase will be identical regardless
is implemented that returns
If a tradable pollution permit regime
grandfathers-all pollution rights,
back to their original holders-i.e.,
to another factory owner B a right
then a factory owner A can convey
to
B before the partition: the right
that A could not have conveyed to
have without the right. Moreover,
use B's factory more than B could
that right to B before the partinote that A could not have conveyed
interest in her factory. That would
tion even if A sold B her entire
A's factory; that transaction would
only allow B to use what had been
use the factory that he had owned
have no impact on B's ability to
though they originated as part of
even before the transaction. Even
under this typical structure thus
an interest in realproperty, the permits
3
property.12 No longer are the
convey rights along the lines of personal
the purchaser obtains the same
rights tied to particular plots of land;
rights, since the permits are fungible.
a prendre' can
example, how the use of a 'profit

123 In this regard, compare, for
See, e.g., 63C
real property into personal property.
convert what had been portions of
rights or a
mineral
of
form
the
in
21 (1997) (" [R]eal property
AM. JUR. 2D Property §
physical substance is
into personal property when the
profit a prendre is transformed
omitted)).
severed from the land." (footnote
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To this point, I have demonstrated that tradable pollution permits need not be as fungible as the common wisdom suggests that they
must be. In this sense, the notion that tradable pollution permit regimes are inherently subject to the "commodification" critique by virtue of the fungibility of the permits is at least somewhat suspect. But
there is a further point on the fungibility score: While regimes other
than tradable pollution permit regimes may not give rise to fungible
property that is exchangeable on a market-that is, they do not exhibit what I will refer to as "market-fungibility"-still, these other environmental regulatory regimes can also, and generally do, feature a
certain aspect of fungibility. They tend to exhibit what I will refer to
as "degradation-fungibility."
Before proceeding, let me explicate the distinction between
"market-fungibility" and "degradation-fungibility."' 124 Market-fungibility is the species of fungibility I have to this point been discussing. It
exists where pollution rights are separated from any underlying property interest, such that it does not matter which permit someone
purchases; any permit would convey upon the purchaser the same
rights. Market-fungibility, as I have described above, rests on the validity of dissociating a right from the particular underlying property with
which it previously was associated. In other words, partitioning is a
necessary prerequisite to market-fungibility, meaning that all market25
fungible regimes are tradable pollution permit regimes.
Market-fungibility is to be distinguished from degradation-fungibility. I use "degradation-fungibility" to refer to a regulatory regime's
general failure to treat emissions that cause varying amounts of damages at different times and locations differently. That is, a regulatory
regime is degradation-fungible if it regulates two emissions of the
same amount of a pollutant equally without regard to whether the
location and extent of the harm caused by the emissions are the same.
By way of illustration, the first hypothetical system that I described above126 (involving tradable permits to dispose of hazardous
124 Both types of fungibility square with Margaret Radin's inclusive understanding
of fungibility. See RADIN, supranote 57, at 118 ("By fungibility, I mean at least that the
things are fully interchangeable with no effect on value to the holder."); id. at 118-20;
see also U.C.C. § 1-201 (b) (18) (A) (2006) (defining "fungible goods" as goods of which
"any unit, by nature or usage of trade, is the equivalent of any other like unit"); cf
Schauer, supra note 56, at 1217-19 (noting instances in which things that are claimed
to be "the same" nonetheless are substantially different from one another).
125 Note that the converse is not true, insofar as the first hypothetical system that I
described above (involving tradable permits to dispose of hazardous wastes) is not
market-fungible. See supra text accompanying notes 119-23.
126 See id.
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wastes) is degradation-fungible if it treats disposals of wastes that cause
different types of damage (insofar as damage caused will depend
upon the particular wastes disposed of, as well as the features of the
specific disposal locations) the same way by, for example, conferring
on each landowner precisely the same number of disposal permits in
the first instance. More generally, any environmental regulatory regime may, and in fact many do, improperly equate actions that cause
different environmental harms. Command-and-control systems generally treat pollution sources in the same way-or, to the extent they
do not, they do not discriminate based upon factors likely to correspond to differences in environmental harm. 2 7 Environmental tax
regimes generally impose a uniform tax rate and thus do not take into
account differences in environmental damage that different emissions
might cause. 128 Information-based regimes generally impose the
same disclosure requirements on all polluters and emissions for each
129
pollutant.
Note that the set of environmental regulatory regimes that is market-fungible overlaps with the set of regimes that is degradation-fungible, but also that the two sets are distinct, As Table 1 reflects, there
are regimes that are market-fungible but not degradation-fungible,
and there are regimes that are degradation-fungible but not marketfungible. Indeed, not all tradable permit systems are degradation-fungible. For example, an ambient permit system is market-fungible but
not degradation-fungible. Further, systems other than tradable permit systems can be degradation-fungible. For example, a typical taxbased regime, which imposes the same tax rate on all emissions of a
non-global pollutant, is degradation-fungible (since it fails to treat differently pollution emissions that cause different amounts of damage
at different locations) but not market-fungible; the same is true of a

127 For example, the Clean Air Act imposes stricter standards on new emission
sources. See Clean Air Act, §§ 165, 169, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7479(i) (2000); see also
Nash, supra note 23, at 518 (stating that existing environmental laws place higher
standards on new plants than on existing ones). But it is older sources that are more
likely to be out-of-date and "dirtier," and thus to cause larger environmental damage.
See id. at 515 & n.199.
128 But see supra note 97 (discussing the possible use of a variable tax rate to address this problem).
129 At the same time, one might expect public reaction to the disclosure to be
greater where the possible environmental damage is likely to be greater.

In that

sense, the programs, combined with the public involvement that the programs anticipate, to some degree take into account differences in environmental harm.
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typical command-and-control regime that ignores differences in pollu30
tion damage caused by different emissions.'
TABLE 1.

MARKET-FUNGIBILITY AND DEGRADATION-FUNGIBILITY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY REGIMES

Type of Regime

Market-

Degradation-

Fungible?

Fungible?

Typical Emission Permit Trading Regime

Yes

Yes

Ambient Permit Trading Regime

Yes

No

Hypothetical Hazardous Waste Disposal Permit
Trading Regime

Depends*

Yes

Typical Tax Regime

No

Yes

Source-Specific Tax Regime

No

No

Typical Command-and-Control Regime
See supra Part IV.B.2.

No

Yes

While market- and degradation-fungibility are distinct concepts,
in practice the demands of market-fungibility generally encourage the
acceptance of degradation-fungibility. Society enjoys the full benefits
of pollution trading-that is, cost-effective reduction of pollutiononly where the regime is fully market-fungible.1 3 1 But, unless the system involves permits for environmental degradation (a possible, but
complicated, option),232 the permits.will simply represent pollution
emissions, and it is unlikely that two emissions of the same amount of
the same pollutant from two different locations (and otherwise under
different conditions) will have the same impact on environmental
quality.13 3 It still may be possible to allow trading among polluters
located within close proximity to one another, on the theory that the
degradation impact of emissions from polluters located close to one
another will be substantially the same. But, even putting aside the
problems with this approach,13- 4 the fact remains that the imposition
130 SeeJames Salzman &J.B. Ruh], Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. Rav. 607, 624 n.36 (2000) ("Proxy choice is not solely a challenge
for [environmental trading markets]. We do the same for traditional command-andcontrol regulation. The emissions from coal-fired utilities, for example, are limited in
terms of tons of sulfur, not by the net impact from their release.").
131 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 45, at 111 (emphasizing the importance of a "uniform homogenous commodity" to a successful marketable permit program).
132 See infra note 145.
133 See Nash & Revesz, supra note 29, at 576-80. Note that this is not the case for
so-called "global pollutants." See id. at 576.
134 See id. at 616 ("No matter how much attention the policymaker devotes to constructing zonal boundaries in light of topography and wind patterns, emissions of
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of restrictions on the number of viable traders at some point may become so strict that they impede the viable operation of the permit
market. A solution to this problem is to expand the number of viable
traders, but this can only be done by increasing degradation-fungibility. 135 Thus do the demands of market-fungibility create an incentive
for increased degradation-fungibility.
The distinction between market- and degradation-fungibility is
important because, while both forms of fungibility can serve as the
basis for the "commodification" critique, only market-based fungibility
seems in practice to be so used. I return to the latter point below; 136
for now, I demonstrate that both forms of fungibility can serve to
ground the "commodification" critique.
As an initial matter, it seems clear that the applicability of the
"commodification" critique is at its zenith where both market- and
degradation-fungibility inhere. Thus, a full-fledged traditional tradable pollution permit regime is the quintessential regulatory instru1 37
ment to which the critique applies.
Market-fungibility, standing alone, also can serve as a basis for
assertion of the "commodification" critique against a regulatory regime. Consider, for example, the commodification critique in the
context of the hypothetical regulatory regime described above, under
which the government issues permits that allow holders to dispose of
hazardous waste but where the permits, though tradable, remain tied
to particular pieces of land. 3-8 It seems that the critique is less applicable to such a regime, which is degradation-fungible but not marketfungible: After all, the regime has not given rise to a unified market
for fungible pollution permits, but only to multiple smaller markets
for particular pollution permits. Still, the fact remains that actual
markets in the permits exist, confirming the applicability of the
critique.
Degradation-fungibility, standing alone, can serve as a basis for
assertion of the "commodification" critique as well. An environmental
regulatory regime that is degradation-fungible gives rise to rights to
local and regional pollutants from different locations, even within the zone, are not
equivalent. Rather, they remain spatially differentiated and will have somewhat different impacts-in terms of location and magnitude.").
135 See id. at 617. James Salzman and J.B. Ruhl describe this as the "inevitable
tradeoff between fat and sloppy or thin and bland." Salzman & Ruhl, supranote 130,
at 645; see id. at 645-47.
136

See infra text accompanying notes 183-85.

137

See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.

138

See supra Part IV.B.2.
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such "miscommodifications" are not uncommon among tradable pol145
lution permit regimes; rather, they are the norm.
145 E.g., Nash & Revesz, supra note 29, at 582-614 (describing how existing tradable pollution permit programs allow for generally unfettered trades of emissions of
spatially differentiated pollutants).
Environmental economists have proffered proposals to structure tradable pollution permit regimes so as to address this concern, but each has its drawbacks. Standard proposals include emissions trading with multiple zones, markets in units of
environmental degradation or (equivalently) ambient permit systems (the latter of
which I discuss in the text just below), and pollution offset markets. See id. at 614-24.
Emissions trading with multiple zones entails division of the regulated region into
multiple trading zones, with the possibility of allowing no interzonal trading, or of
translation factors for interzonal trading; the problem is that, to the extent that the
markets are small enough seriously to address the problem, they may be too small to
sustain trading. See id. at 614-18; Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 130, at 645 (noting the
"inevitable tradeoff between fat and sloppy or thin and bland"); id. at 645-47. Ambient permit systems feature the trading of units of environmental degradation, not
emissions amounts; they require maintenance of multiple markets (in respect of the
multiple points at which environmental degradation is measured) and, as such, entail
substantial transactions and administrative costs. See Nash & Revesz, supra note 29, at
618-21. Pollution offset markets entail a "single market in emission permits but
[one] in which trades are not effected on a one-to-one basis," id. at 622; they, too, give
rise to substantial transactions and administrative costs, see id. at 621-24.
In short, all these proposals would tend to impose substantial transactions and
administrative costs that may undermine the very market upon which the trading regime relies to achieve its goal of pollution reduction at the lowest possible cost. Indeed, this is true for the one trading system that (by definition) does create the
proper commodity-an ambient permit system, under which permits entitle their
holders, not to emit a certain amount of pollutant, but rather to engage in an activity
that results in the degradation of the environment at a particular location. See supra
note 140.
Richard Revesz and I recently proposed a modified emission permit trading system that would retain the trading of emissions but at the same time would constrain
the environmental degradation that results from improperly equating emissions of
spatially differentiated pollutants from different locations and over time. See Nash &
Revesz, supra note 29, at 624-28. Our proposal relies upon a single market for emissions permits. Receptor points, and acceptable pollution levels at all receptor points
(based, presumably, on concerns of health, welfare, justice, and practicality), would
be chosen. Approval of a trade of permits would be required before the trade could
be consummated. Responsibility for grants and denials of approval would rest with a
website, which would harness a pollution dispersion model. All pertinent data regarding polluters (and prospective polluters) that the model required to predict pollutant
concentrations-including emission locations, stack heights, temperature and velocity of emissions, and weather and topographical data-would be loaded onto the website. After verification that the initial allocation of permits would not result in
unacceptably high pollutant concentrations, the website would await requests for approval of trades. In determining whether to grant approval for a trade, the website
would modify temporarily its emissions data to reflect provisionally the shift in permit
use. The website then would use the dispersion model to predict pollutant concentra-
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a problem particular to
Moreover, degradation-fungibility is not
permit regimes. As I have exmarket-fungible tradable pollution
permit regime that is not
plained above, even a tradable pollution
4 6 And other environmarket-fungible can be degradation-fungible.'
generally are--degradationmental regulatory regimes can be-and
147 For example, a command-andfungible but not market-fungible.
technology requirement on
control regime that imposes a uniform
industry treats as equivalent
mercury-emitting factories in a certain
to continue once the stanthe emissions of mercury that are allowed
dard has been met.
is a cornerstone of cornTo the extent that commensurability
148 it would seem, then, that degradation-fungibility
modification,
the "commodification" critique.
might serve as a basis for assertion of
perhaps framing effects shield
The fact that it does not suggests that
perception of regulatory
this form of fungibility from the common
1 49
point below.
regimes; I return to this
3.

Cost-Benefit Analysis

and environmental
A final point in relation to commodification
regimes are singled out
regulatory regimes is that, while market-based
quality, other regulatory
for giving rise to markets in environmental
generally do, make use of costapproaches can, and in fact in practice

model predicted that pollutant concentrations
tions in the wake of the trade. If the
the website
levels at all receptor points, then
would be at or less than acceptable
If, howdata.
emissions
modified
and retain the
would grant approval for the trade
(or
point
pollutant concentration at any receptor
ever, the model predicted that the
and
trade
the
reject
then the website would
to
points) would exceed acceptable levels,
way, the website then would be ready
Either
data.
emissions
revert to the pretrade
other trades. Id. at 626.
consider requests for approval for
but
eliminate the commodification issue,
The system we propose would not
potentially
to
rise
give
not
so in a way that would
would substantially limit it, and do
the
costs. See id. at 628-33 (arguing that
administrative
and
fatally large transactions
other
with
emission regime" compares favorably
proposed "constrained single-zone
Thus, this aspect of the commodificatradable pollution permit regime structures).
by modifying the structure of the trading
tion issue can be addressed substantially
system.

146
147
148
149

See supra Table 1.
See id.
56-59.
See supra text accompanying notes
V.B.2.
Part
See infra
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In short, both market-based and non-market-based
51
the environment
regulatory instruments place a value on
and market rhetoric are
At the same time, it is true that markets
approaches, while reliance
seen to inhere in market-based regulatory
approaches seems far more attenon cost-benefit analysis under other
a priori rather than on a case-by-case
uated: After all, it is conducted
acregulator and not by the societal
basis, and it is conducted by the
to
much
how
as to whether and
tors who will make the decision
pollute.
issue of framing raises the quesAt the same time, however, the
is the result of perception,
tion of the extent to which the attenuation
by the frames through which
and in particular whether it is prompted
approaches are seen. I elabothe various environmental regulatory
1 52
next Part.
rate on this point in the

benefit analysis

V.

1 50

OF THE CRITIQUES
FRAMING AND THE PERSISTENCE

"right to pollute" and "coinThe previous Part analyzed the
of economic reality, and demonmodification" critiques in the light
critique applies to all environmental
strated that the "right to pollute"
the
of absolute pollution bans, while
regulatory instruments short
marketto
only
not
"commodification" critique can be seen to apply
Inregulatory instruments as well.
based instruments, but to other
perthe "right to pollute" critique of
deed, Lior Strahilevitz dismisses
153 while Eric Posner implies
mits as "too simplistic to be satisfying,"
a
be unobjectionable since they create
that marketable permits should
to
"a firm's norm-grounded entitlement
property right that is based upon
pollute 'a little.'"154
(1) (B) (2000)
304(b) (1) (B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)
150 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, §
in determinfactor
a
as
consider
to
Agency
(directing the Environmental Protection
"total cost of apthe
available"
currently
ing the "best practicable control technology
be achieved
to the effluent reduction benefits to
plication of technology in relation
cost-benefit
statutory
various
of

taxonomical overview
from such application"). For a
MICH. L. REv.
Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99
Sunstein,
R.
Cass
see
requirements,
1651, 1663-67 (2001).
"deal with limited
50, at 198 (Market-based regimes
151 See Stewart, supra note
by socially progenerated
for disposing of residuals
rights to use common resources
command regand
regimes]
between [market-based
ductive activities. The difference
value that we
The
these usufructory rights.
ulation is the mechanism for allocating
limitations
residuals
the
water is the same whether
reguplace on distant vistas and clean
command
through
achieved
values are
needed to preserve these environmental
regimes]."); supra Part 11I.B.
lation or through [market-based
152 See infra Part V.B.2.
at 1285.
153 Strahilevitz, supra note 50,
(emphasis added).
1735
at
104,
note
154 Posner, supra
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and describe in greater
Nonetheless, as I have suggested above
diverge from perception in redetail here, economic reality seems to
perception is that both critiques
spect of the critiques. The prevailing
with tradable pollution
apply particularly to market-based regulation,
to the commodification critique.
permit regimes especially susceptible
as one source of that divergence.
In this Part, I identify framing effects
competing environmental regulaThe differing frames through which
perceived, render some
tory instruments are presented, and therefore
to the critiques than others, the
of those instruments more susceptible
First, I describe the natural
reality of the situation notwithstanding.
regulatory approaches. I then
frames of the various environmental
on perception of the devices.
turn to the effects of those frames
A.

The Frames of Environmental Regulatory

Devices

the framing of acts and acI focus upon two aspects of framing:
of acts and actors,
tors, and the framing of outcomes. By the framing
whether public or private,
-55 By
I mean to refer to the set of societal actors,
the regulation.
of
frame
the
within
naturally
fall
whose acts
to whether the regulation tends
framing of outcomes, I mean to refer
experiencing a loss or gain by
to frame particular societal actors as
virtue of the regulation.'

56

are salient. First, marTwo aspects of framing of acts and actors
their effects in a way that
ket-based regulations tend to frame
It relegates government to issumarginalizes the role of government:
divorced from any substantial
ing pollution rights to societal actors,
regulations tend to partition
decisionmaking. Second, market-based
actor from the socially beneficial
the pollution emissions of a societal
I elaborate on each
activity that the actor is presumably undertaking.
of these points in turn.
in terms of individMarket-based regulations frame their function
by private actors; the role
ual cost-benefit-based decisions undertaken
1 5 7 In reality, the government plays a
of government is deemphasized.
in establishing and administersubstantial, important, and active role
a tax regime, the government
ing market-based regulation. Under
tax. Under a tradable pollumust establish, collect, and enforce the
must establish the ceiling for
tion permit regime, the government
con15 (describing Tversky and Kahneman's
155 Cf supratext accompanying note
454-55).
at
Kahneman, supra note 7,
cept of "framing of acts," Tversky &
con17 (describing Tversky and Kahneman's
note
156 Cf supra text accompanying
456-57).
at
7,
note
supra
& Kahneman,
cept of "framing of outcomes," Tversky
incentives
at 16 (distinguishing between market
42,
note
supra
al.,
et
Anderson
157
structure).
and the governmental command-and-control
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overall pollution emissions, allocate the permits, monitor the trading,
and ensure that no source emits more pollutant than its holding of
permits authorizes. Nonetheless, the regimes are framed in a way so
as to emphasize the role of individual actors-in terms of deciding
whether to pay the tax and pollute more, or whether to buy or sell
permits-rather than the role of government.
In contrast, non-market-based regimes frame themselves in terms
of the establishment by the government of a standard (whether technological or effluent) with which pollution sources must comply. The
focus is on the government's relationship-as rule-setter and enforcer-with polluters.
Market-based regulations tend also to frame their function so as
to partition the act of pollution from the underlying activity out of
which the pollution emission originates.' 5 8 For instance, a tax regime
focuses attention on the payment of the tax by a pollution source in
return for the "right" to continue to pollute; little if any emphasis falls
on the activity (presumably beneficial to society) of which the pollution emissions are byproducts. This is even more the case for tradable
pollution permit regimes, where the focus is on the purchase of permits in order to vindicate a source's "right" to pollute more-or on
the sale of permits that will allow the buyer to pollute more, in exchange for which the seller obtains money. In short, the focus is on
the exchange of the permits for money, and not upon the effect of the
permit transfer on either actor's ability to engage in their underlying
societally beneficial activities.
Although, as I have discussed above, all environmental regulatory
devices create "rights to pollute," 59 non-market-based regimes do not
put the focus on those rights. Rather, the focus is on the factory
(i) complying with applicable standards and then, (ii) continuing its
business with the associated pollution byproduct still linked to the underlying beneficial activity, and therefore not subject to a separate and
independent focus.
In terms of framing of outcomes, non-market-based regulations
tend to present the government as imposing a limit or restriction on
polluters' preexisting freedom to pollute. In this sense, to the extent
that people are generally in favor of reductions in pollution emissions,
these regulations are framed as achieving a gain vis-a-vis the status
quo. Even an information-based regime that does not itself restrict
158 See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 Y~a L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 40-43) (discussing the analytical import of separating harm
an activity causes from its benefit).
159 See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
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or impose a technology requirethe amount of authorized pollution
requirement; at worst, it comes
ment does still impose a disclosure
across as continuing the status quo.
tend to be understood as
By contrast, market-based regulations
"rights" on pollution sources.
having the government confer pollution
reductions are good, these regimes
From the viewpoint that pollution
This is because the regimes' frame
are framed as achieving a loss.
that is not the actual status quo:
implicitly adopts a reference point
the market-based regulation, polThe reference point is that, but for
In practice, the implementation
luters would have no right to pollute.
almost always results in a reducof a market-based regulatory regime
to the status quo ante, but the
tion in total pollution as compared
that fact.
frame of these devices tends to obscure
FramingEffects of Environmental Regulation
and non-market-based
With the differing frames of market-based
place, I turn to the effects of those
environmental regulatory tools in
reality notwithstanding, the
frames and the question of why, economic critiques retain particular
"right to pollute" and "commodification"
forms of regulation.
vigor with respect to market-based
B.

1. The "Right to Pollute" Critique
"right to pollute" critique to
The perceived applicability of the
but not other forms of regulamarket-based environmental regulation
frames. In particular,
tion results from the different instruments'
susceptibility of market-based regthree factors intensify the perceived
instruments' portrayal of governulation to the critique: market-based
polluters rather than restricting
ment as conferring rights on
instruments' depiction of governpolluters' behavior, market-based
those rights, and market-based
ment's role as limited to conferring
of pollution emissions from the
instruments' perceived partitioning
emissions are a byproduct.
-underlying activity of which the
portray the government as conferFirst, market-based regulations
with other regulatory forms that
ring rights on polluters, as compared
conas taking rights away from-i.e.,
depict the government
the
to
60 This perception lends itself naturally
straining-polluters.1
apinstruments, in contrast to other
characterization of market-based
actors.
to pollute" on societal
proaches, as conferring a "right
is the second factor, that govReinforcing this characterization
market-based approaches to conferernment's role is limited under
160

See supra Part V.A.
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ring rights upon societal actors. A typical command-and-control
approach conforms to a standard Austinian conception of law's role as
a command from the sovereign backed up by legal sanction for failure
to achieve compliance. t 6 ' In contrast, market-based approaches are
seen to relegate the role of government to conferring "rights" to societal actors, with the societal actors enjoying the power to choose
whether and how much to pollute. The framing effect, then, is to
portray market-based approaches as imposing "a mere price" with no
sanction. 162
Third, market-based regulations partition perceptually the pollution right from the underlying property right-i.e., the underlying
beneficial social activity of which the pollution emission is a byproduct. This enhances the perception that the "right to pollute" that
government conveys under market-based approaches is a right to engage in an activity that is divorced from any beneficial activity-i.e., is
divorced of any positive value. In effect, the partitioning conceals the
tradeoff that society makes by allowing some pollution in order to enjoy the benefits of the socially useful activity that generates pollution
as an unwanted, but (at least at the present time) necessary, byproduct. By removing the explicit tie to any underlying beneficial activity, the partitioning encourages a focus on stand-alone pollution,
which seems more of a "pure evil."
This focus lends support to the comparison, advanced by Robert
Goodin, between transactions in stand-alone pollution rights
(whether under a tax or tradable pollution permit system) and sales of
indulgences by the medieval Catholic Church) 6 3 There, too, there
was a perceived separation between the indulgence and the "bad act"
for which the indulgence supposedly was penitence. The indulgence
proved problematic because of the lack of apparent link between the
indulgence and the "bad act," which undermined the validity of the
164
indulgence.
The view of pollution as a pure evil supports the comparison of
pollution rights with other societal ills such as murder and racial discrimination. The fact remains that pollution is simply not comparable
to murder or racial discrimination. Racial discrimination, for example, rightly deserves societal condemnation. An attempt to address
161 See, e.g., James Bacchus, Groping Toward Grotius: The WTO and the International
Rule of Law, 44 HARv. INT'L L.J. 533, 537 (2003) ("UJohn] Austin defined a law as a
rule laid down by a sovereign power that can be enforced through a penalty for failing
to obey it.").
162

See supra note 108 and accompanying text.

163
164

See Goodin, supra note 50, at 578-87.
See id. at 579-80.
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the problem of racial discrimination by using a market to allocate the
right to discriminate 16 5 or the right to murder'

66

would undermine

the stigma that properly should be associated with discrimination and
with murder, and thus is fraught with problems. Some argue that a
market in pollution rights (and, to a lesser extent, a tax-based regime)
similarly undercuts the government's condemnation of pollution. But
in fact, as discussed above, the two settings are quite different. 67 Pollution is a necessary byproduct of many beneficial activities and services; 1 6 8 racial discrimination1 6 9 and murder simply are not. Thus,
165 See Derrick Bell, Foreword: The FinalCivil Rights Act, 79 CAL. L. REv. 597, 600-03
(1991) (parodying the notion of legislation that would establish a market for racial
discrimination rights); cf. Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 133, 134 (1994) (describing how a market for racial discrimination rights could
be structured, but recognizing at the same time that such a system would "dilute the
law's symbolic condemnation of discrimination," and that "economic analysis has no
theory of the symbolic and education function of law").
166 Cf Penner, supra note 118, at 804. Penner notes:
[O]ne could ...devise a "right not to be murdered" which was property and
thus transferable. One can imagine a society in which only nobles had the
legal right not to be murdered, and where everyone else had to rely on the
morality of their fellows or on self-defense. Imagine that some down-at-heel
nobles discovered that they could legally sell their rights not to be murdered, and did so. This is an example ofan alienable right not to be murdered. But while this is a case of imaginable property, it violates the concept
of property we actually have, in terms of the role it plays for us. We do not
conceive of a property right not to be murdered because our legal right not
to be murdered is notjustified by a title, purchased or not. Our legal right
not to be murdered is based upon considerations about the universal status
of persons. A person is conceived as having the right simply by being a living
human. Such a right cannot be conceived as alienable any more than a person's life can be. One cannot separate one's life from oneself, to abandon it,
give it away, or sell it, because one is one's life, or at least, whatever one is,
one is not the same thing without it.
id. (emphasis omitted).
167 See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 263. Sunstein highlights the difference between
racial discrimination, which a flat ban appropriately suggests is illicit and signals that
it is "the sort of practice to be eliminated rather than be brought to some optimal
point," id., and pollution, for which "there is an optimal level of pollution, and it is
not zero, and polluting activity-so long as it is part of a legitimate business, and not
an intentional tort-is not the kind of thing that it is appropriate to delegitimate as
such," id. at 263 n.195.
168 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
169 The modifier "racial" is important. Once we move beyond the setting of racial
discrimination to, for example, gender discrimination, it may be that certain aspects
of particular jobs make those jobs "necessarily" more appropriate for people of one
gender than another; gender discrimination might be described as "necessary" under
such conditions. At the same time, however, what might seem at first to be a "necessary job qualification at one time might turn out instead to have been the product of
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while it is appropriate fully to condemn racial discrimination and
murder, the same is not true of pollution. 70 It might seem appropriate to condemn the release of pollutants in the abstract with no connection to any benefit flowing therefrom, but the conception
underlying this view is unrealistic. The appropriateness of a pollution
emission can only be judged in light of the benefit that results from
the activity that produces the pollution as a byproduct.17 1
Nonetheless, a market for pollution emissions rights makes it easier to accept the notion of pollution as a pure evil, akin to racial discrimination, by encouraging the conceptualization of pollution as
detached from any underlying beneficial activity. In effect, a marketable permit system gives rise to a "disconnect" between the pollution
emissions and the beneficial activity.
These three framing effects blend together to bolster strongly the
perception that the "right to pollute" critique applies more strongly to
market-based mechanisms. Not only does the government afford
(undesirable) societal mores that seemed necessary but in fact were only a preference. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 387-88 (5th Cir.
1971) (rejecting the defendant's argument, and the trial court's holding, that the fact
that passengers expected, and psychologically required, flight attendants to be female
constituted a valid justification for hiring only female flight attendants).
170 Cass Sunstein explains:
As a first approximation, a flat ban on an activity may well be preferable to a
cash payment for resulting harm, assuming that there are no transaction
costs (such as enforcement expenditures), when and only when the right level of
the underlying activity is zero. The right level of assaults and poisonings seems
to be zero. It would therefore be absurd to allow people to assault and
poison others as long as they are willing to compensate people for the harm.
Such a strategy would be inconsistent with the underlying goal of eliminating the conduct altogether.
By contrast, the appropriate emissions level for many pollutants is well
above zero. For example, complete elimination of sulfur dioxide emissions
would cause a severe energy shortage-one that would dramatically increase
poverty, health risks, unemployment, and inflation. In this respect, a ban on
sulfur dioxide emissions would be difficult to justify. For those pollutants
whose continued emissions is necessary to achieve desirable social goals, a
fee, designed to bring about the optimal emissions level, makes far more
sense than a ban.
Cass R. Sunstein, AdministrativeSubstance, 1991 DuKE L.J. 607, 635-36 (footnotes omitted); see also Stewart, supra note 50, at 199 ("The discharge within proper limits of
residuals from socially productive activities ... can by no means be equated with sin
or murder or racial discrimination.").
171 This does not mean that absolute bans of particular types of pollution should
be precluded. See supra note 101. Indeed, more generally, it may be that the pollution that results from a particular activity is so harmful that the activity itself should be
banned.
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rights to polluters rather than taking them away, but (the perception
continues) the government by doing so cedes decisionmaking authority to polluters. And, further, to the extent that the partitioning of
pollution depicts pollution emissions as purely negative, the conveyance by the government of "rights to pollute" confirms the notion that
the government thus sets a "mere price" for pollution without establishing any norm; 7 2 it seems as though, by conferring absolute rights
to pollute, the government is abandoning any anti-pollution norm.
Thus, while Posner speaks of a "norm not to pollute 'too much'" 73and, in fact, market-based systems are consistent with such a normthe framing effects make it seem that the government is instead not
174
endorsing any anti-pollution norm at all.
2.

The "Commodification" Critique

Two framing features render market-based regulatory formsand especially tradable pollution permit systems-especially susceptible to the "commodification" critique: First, marketable permit systems tend to emphasize the individual power enjoyed by, and
decisions made by, societal actors, and to deemphasize government's
role; other regimes, in contrast, tend to emphasize the government's
role as rule-setter and enforcer. 175 Second, market-based regimes are
seen to decouple pollution from any underlying beneficial activity.
The emphasis under market-based regulation on individual
choice and action, and the deemphasis of the government's role, foster the perception that market-based instruments commodify the environment. While, as I have discussed above, non-market-based
instruments also tend to rely, at bottom, on some version of cost-benefit analysis, 1 76 that analysis falls outside the frame through which nonmarket-based instruments are pictured. But that is not the case for
172 See supra note 108 and accompanying text; stpra text accompanying note 162.
173 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
174 The absence of government endorsement of an anti-pollution norm may make
it difficult to restore such a norm later. This helps to explain the extreme resistance
on the part of some environmentalists to any market-based mechanisms. Cf Merrill,
supra note 28, at 295 (noting that some "(e]nvironmentalists came to see that... it
was safe to endorse or at least acquiesce in the usage of market mechanisms .. .
[where] they would function solely as a means to an end and would not undermine
the environmentalist position regarding the proper metric for setting standards"). (I
am grateful to Lee Fennell for this point.)
175 This framing effect may make tradable pollution permit regimes attractive to
free market adherents who distrust government regulation. (I am grateful to David
Driesen for this point.)
176 See supra Parts I.B., IV.B.3.
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market-based regulation, where cost-benefit analysis and, therefore,
commodification are center stage. Under a tax regime, the focus is on
each actor's decision as to whether or not to pay the tax and pollute
more. Even more so is the focus on private actors' decisions to transact pollution permits under a tradable permit regime.
The fact that market-based regimes are seen to partition pollution from the underlying activity exacerbates the commodification
problem. On its face, the analysis shifts from a balancing of the benefits of the socially productive goods or activities against the costs of
pollution, to a balancing of the cost of the right to pollute against the
profit that the polluter enjoys by virtue of the polluting act itself, divorced from any societal benefit. The partitioning makes pollution
seem like a pure evil more akin to murder, the application of an economic framework to which, while in reality at least somewhat appropriate, 17 7 seems highly inappropriate.

The foregoing thus paints the susceptibility of market-based regulatory forms to the "commodification" critique as a framing effect.
That conclusion conflicts at least somewhat with the view, advanced by
proponents of the "commodification" critique, that market-based regulation inherently commodifies-and, by omission, other forms of environmental regulation do not commodify-the environment. Three
factors support the view that the applicability of the "commodification" critique is at least in part due to framing.

177 While Elizabeth Anderson adheres to the view that cost-benefit analysis involves commodification of the environment, she does concede that the environment
presents a different case from other areas where commodification has been seen to be
problematic:
Whereas we neither have a market in human lives nor regard human beings
primarily as economic resources, we do have markets in land, water, animals,
and natural resources. Our dominant relations to these things are economic. The choices people make as consumers of environmental goods are
arguably more autonomous than the choices people make as sellers of their
labor power.
ANDERSON, supra note 76, at 203-04; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences,
Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217, 247-53 (1993) (to the same effect); Sunstein, supra note 57, at 786-87, 834-40 (describing two coexistent, yet somewhat inconsistent, means of valuation for environmental quality and goods); Spaulding, supra
note 82, at 297-98 (describing both market-based approaches and command-andcontrol approaches as examples of "incomplete commodification" on the spectrum
between "complete commodification" and "complete non-commodification," with
market-based approaches "Ic]loser to free market environmentalism"). But cf. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 80, at 1562-81 (critiquing the underpinnings and
methodology of cost-benefit analysis).
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First, Saul Levmore argues that the commodification critique as a
general matter is largely instrumental. 171 He explains that the critique seems to persist precisely in situations where it is the case (or at
least it is believed to be the case) that the collective weal will suffer as a
result of trading the "commodity" in question. As such, the critique
"suffers from something of a circularity problem." 7 9 Levmore's view
accords well with the notion that the applicability of the "commodification" critique results from framing: The way in which the effect on
the public weal is presented, i.e., framed, may fuel-or defuse-criticisms of the proposed commodification.
Second, as I have discussed above, most environmental regulatory
regimes involve some measure of cost-benefit analysis. 180 But the
"commodification" critique is commonly leveled against market-based
regulatory forms. This suggests that the cost-benefit analysis present
in other regimes simply falls outside the pertinent regulatory frame.' 8 '
Third, the absence of criticisms of environmental regulatory instruments on degradation-fungibilitygrounds suggests that the extent
and scope of commodification may be affected by framing. As I have
suggested above,1 8 2 one would expect proponents of the commodification critique to be piqued by degradation-fungibility-not specifically because of the possible development of "hot spots" themselves
(though that raises its own environmental justice concerns' 8 3 ), but

rather because of the fact that those who promulgate degradationfungible systems value the existence of a broad market over the selec178
179

See Levmore, supra note 39, at 115-16 & n.8.
Id. at 115.

180 See supra Parts III.B., V.B.3.
181 Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart, as well as Cass Sunstein, maintain that
tradable pollution permit regimes are preferable to other environmental regulatory
instruments because of their democratizing features. In particular, they argue that
the tradable permit regimes enhance democracy by promoting a focus on the fundamental question of how much pollution should be allowed, as compared with command-and-control regimes that typically focus on questions, such as the appropriate
technology to be required to achieve pollution reduction, that are far less accessible.
See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 38, at 1352-53; Cass R. Sunstein, Democratizing America Through Law, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 949, 967 (1991). But, if the frame of
market-based environmental regulatory instruments in fact tends to deemphasize the
role of government, then Ackerman and Stewart's, and Sunstein's reliance upon the
question of the overall level of acceptable pollution as the focal point of market-based
programs is misplaced. Perhaps tradable permit systems do not effectively democratize if their frame does not put emphasis on that question. Cf Heinzerling, supra
note 86 (questioning Ackerman and Stewart's, and Sunstein's democratization assertion on theoretical and empirical grounds).
182 See supra notes 138-49 and accompanying text.
183 See Nash & Revesz, supra note 29, at 580-81, 613-14.
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18 4 Market values trition of a scientifically defensible commodity.
argument would seem to lie. Yet,
umph over other values, the natural
systems value establishment
the argument that degradation-fungible
all else is essentially absent from the
of a broad-based commodity 8over
5 It thus seems that the frame through
commodification literature.'
(in various forms) are presented
which environmental regulations
particular environmental harm
deemphasizes the question of the
instead on emission amounts.
caused by emissions, with the emphasis
degree to which the regulation
The frame, in other words, affects the
is perceived to commodify the environment. frame that emphasizes
of a
Fourth, in terms of the importance
and commodification, a study
(or deemphasizes) cost-benefit analysis
area-corporate risk analysis
conducted by Kip Viscusi in a related
a useful analog. Risk
and the award of punitive damages'86-Provides
the absolute eradication of risk
is similar to pollution. Like pollution,
Further, while there is
is unattainable and, moreover, undesirable.
1 7
in reality the
of reducing risk,
much public rhetoric on the ideal
risk for cost savings, i.e., for the
public is quite willing to accept higher
be
affordable that would not
9 88
benefit of making goods and activities
alone completely eliminated)
were risk substantially reduced (let

as an
meets the description of "fungibility"
184 Note that degradation-fungibility
Radin. See
Margaret
by
offered
17
indicia of commodification in the conceptualization
.
supra note 58 at 1880 & nn.115Radin,
118;
at
57,
note
supra
RADIN,
treatises for
and
search of legal journals
185 On September 23, 2006, a Westlaw
or "hot
justice"
"environmental
and
documents that refer to "commodification"
suggested
only nine results. Vicki Been has
spots" in the same paragraph produced
assert
use a commodification argument to
might
that environmental justice advocates
locallyfrom
away
live
to
to sell their right
that society ought not to allow people
to Pay
Compensated Siting Proposals: Is It Time
Been,
Vicki
See
undesirable land uses.
to Do
Got
824 (1994); Vicki Been, What's Fairness
Attention?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787,
CORNELL
78
Uses,
Siting of Locally UndesirableLand
with It? EnvironmentalJustice and the
a genSpaulding discusses 'hot spots' under
Norman
L. REv. 1001, 1040-41 (1993).
See
regulation.
environmental
and market-based
eral analysis of commodification
n.95.
Spaulding, supra note 82, at 323 &
cona taxonomy of environmental justice
By contrast, an article that presents
of
Taxonomy
A
Kuehn,
R.
See Robert
cerns contains no reference to commodification.
10,681 (2000).
EnvironmentalJustice, 30 ENvrL. L. RFP.
REv'. 547
Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L.
Risk
Corporate
Viscusi,
Kip
W.
186 See
(2000).
Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs,
187 See, e.g., John D. Graham & Jonathan
& Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1997).
in RISK vs. RISK 1, 1 (John D. Graham
at 548-49. Viscusi elaborates:
188 See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 186,
of accepting risk tradeoffs is implicit
On a personal level, the approach
all the time. We ride in motor vehicles,
in our daily lives. We take chances
that is
foods, and live in an environment
fly on planes, eat potentially risky
strike
to
seek
we
as
inevitable
are
kind
not risk-free. Some tradeoffs of this
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analyses on jury awards
Viscusi studied the effect of corporate risk
of automobile safety design. In
of punitive damages in the context
citizens to try, among
particular, he used surveys of juror-eligible
punitive damage awards of the
other things, to isolate the effect on
had-or had not-conducted a
fact that an automobile manufacturer
feature that later led to injucost-benefit analysis in respect of a design
one would want companies to unries. Viscusi explains that, ideally,
than make similar decisions in
dertake a systematic risk analysis rather
8 9 But, to the contrary, Viscusi's findings indicate
a reckless manner.'
damage awards when comthat jurors tend to arrive at larger punitive
°
analyses 19 As Viscusi
u 91
panies actually engage in explicit cost-benefit
are perverse."
notes, "It] he resulting incentives9 2
to explain the facially counterintuiViscusi offers "conjectures'
Among these conjectures is
tive behavior of individuals in this setting.
might be considered incommensuthe notion that "[m] oney and lives
harm inflicted by risks and the benefits
an appropriate balance between the
task for the individual is to make those
such activities offer for our lives. The
benefits to outweigh the associated
personal decisions that confer sufficient
risks.
different levels of safety, we often
When faced with options that have
of
though not without limit. Millions
pay a higher price for safer products,
bags,
brakes and protective side air
consumers purchase cars with antilock
for safety that we purchase a
concern
unlimited
an
but few of us have such
tank-like Hummer vehicle.
Id.
189

See id. at 550. Viscusi explains:
risks in a systematic manner and to
[W]e want corporations to think about
that there is appropriate risk balancundertake such calculations to ensure
select
We all benefit when corporations
ing that is sufficiently protective.
the
and
safety
with
concern
our own
the level of safety that correctly reflects
costs of providing it.
that
corporations to gauge the risk tradeoffs
Id. Viscusi elucidates that markets allow
consumers are willing to accept:
to make in effect set the price for safety
The risk tradeoffs that we are willing
the
to corporations, which must supply
in the market and provide guidance
that
products
generate
If corporations
products and services we purchase.
into bear given the product price, or
want
we
than
hazards
more
create
risk
product
the
we do not value, then
clude unnecessary safety features that
marketplace.
the
in
mix will not be successful
Id. at 549.
awards when
found that jurors arrived at larger
190 See id. at 556-57. Viscusi also
their costlarger, values of life in conducting
companies used more accurate, but
Thus,
558.
low values of life. See id. at
benefit analyses than when they used artificially
company.
the
for
result
likely
the worse the
the more sound the cost-benefit analysis,
588.
191 Id. at
192 Id. at 586.
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rable."19 3 If that is so, then "[pleople may be averse to explicitly balancing money against human lives." 19 4 Along the same lines of the
commodification critique of market-based environmental regulation,
the argument proceeds, it is more acceptable to engage in risk tradeoffs implicitly than it is to do so explicitly by undertaking an explicit
analysis.' 95 Thus, Viscusi's findings provide perhaps some empirical
193 Id. at 587. Viscusi also advances the possibility that the mock jurors might have
been affected by hindsight bias. In other words, the mock jurors might have seen the
corporations as having balanced the costs of improved safety against people-now
identified people, since an accident has by now occurred-who suffered particular
injuries or died as a result of the lower safety provided, whereas in fact all the corporation did was to compare the costs of improved safety with a number representing the
statistical expected value of harm that would result if the additional safety feature
were not incorporated. See id. at 587-88.
194 Id. at 586-87.
195 Along these lines, compare Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt's explanation
for the vitality of customary or evolutionary approaches (as compared to, inter alia,
market-based approaches) for the distribution of scarce assets. See GuIo CAtLABRESI
& PHILIP BoBsIrr, TRAGIC CHOICES 44-49 (1978). Calabresi and Bobbitt argue that
customary approaches may be valuable because they allocate assets without many of
the costs associated with explicit markets. But they note that, while customary approaches "are likely to reduce and even avoid the costs of costing[, ... this is accomplished by sacrificing honesty and candor. Evolutionary approaches epitomize the
fact that subterfuges do not extinguish the costs of costing, but rather transform them

into costs in honesty." Id. at 146. Cf David L. Shapiro, In Defense ofJudicial Candor,
100 HARv. L. REV. 731, 748 (1987) (arguing that such approaches are prescriptively
questionable, and that the "subterfuge can bring us peace only for a while").
Compare as well the Supreme Court's holding in Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), that the plain language of the Clean Air Act precludes the
EPA from considering costs in setting national ambient air quality standards
("NAAQS"), see id. at 471, with the Court's indication that "secret[ I consider[ation] "
of costs would have to be tolerated (though it would be inconsistent with the Court's
holding), id. at 471 n.4. The Court explained: "Respondents' speculation that the
EPA is secretly considering the costs of attainment without telling anyone is irrelevant
to our interpretive inquiry. If such an allegation could be proved, it would be
grounds for vacating the NAAQS, because the Administrator had not followed the
law." Id. Of course, if in fact EPA indeed considered costs "without telling anyone,"
id., it would be difficult for such an allegation to be proved. By placing the burden of
proof on challengers, the Court in effect provides greater protection for EPA's covert,
as opposed to explicit, considerations of cost.
A distinct, yet somewhat related, point is made by Laurence Tribe in his critique
of the notion of having juries rely too heavily upon mathematical methods. One objection that Tribe raises to such an approach is that it may dehumanize justice. See
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. Ruv. 1329, 1375-77 (1971). Tribe suggests that extensive reliance on mathematics may render the legal system "even more alien and inhuman than it already...
[seems] to distressingly many." Id. at 1376. He also argues that such an approach will
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of the commodification crisupport for the heightened applicability
treatment.
tique in the context of actual market-like
his study of the efadvances
At the same time, Lior Strahilevitz
express lanes as empirical
96
fects of selling the right to use a freeway's
is not always present.'
critique
evidence that the "commodification"
drivers on the freeway, in
Strahilevitz analyzed a system whereunder
freeway's express lanes as opreturn for a charge, gain access to the
with how many cars already
posed to its local lanes. The charge varies
usage leads to a higher user
are using the express lanes; higher
behavior under the system
charge.1 9 7 Strahilevitz found that people's
of the commodification cridoes not conform to what proponents
198 Strahilevitz argues that the freeway express
tique might predict.
to the use of marketable perlane example is substantially analogous1 9 9
mits to regulate environmental quality.
permits is not a strong one
But Strahilevitz's analogy to pollution
who choose to do so pay a onein two important ways. First, those
the express lanes. Once they have
200
time fee, upon admission, to use
to anyone else.
right
use
their
sell
gained admission, they cannot
thus renderprocess in mathematical obscurity,"
serve only to "shroud[ ] the [legal]
Id.
comprehensible.
more,
less, not
ing the trial process and trial outcomes
1272.
at
196 See Strahilevitz, supra note 50,
See
is only a one-time charge upon admission.
there
that
note
But
1251.
at
Id.
197
id.
198 Strahilevitz explains:
the argument that a move from a
The FasTrak experience does not support
activity to one that commodifies the
legal regime prohibiting an undesirable
that behavior. San Diego's increase
activity will undermine the norm against
the
program suggests that, if anything,
in carpooling during the life of the
Carpoolers
stronger.
somewhat
become
norm against solo commuting has
roadtheir contribution to diminished
commodifying
by
that
felt
not
have
it
contrary,
the
To
their activities.
way congestion FasTrak has trivialized
began
program
FasTrak
the
before
appears that those drivers who carpooled
with a greater reward than it did
them
providing
was
society
to feel that
beforehand.
Id. at 1289.
199 See id. at 1288-91.
salidoes not think the distinction is ultimately
200 Strahilevitz recognizes this, but
ent to the question of commodification:
tradable pollution permits and the
An important distinction [between
concerns the fact that the right for
San Diego freeway-express lane example]
analyis not, at present, alienable. The
solo drivers to use the Express Lanes
differlittle
makes
alienability
this lack of
sis herein, however, suggests that
if anything, making access to the
Indeed,
norms.
to
respect
ence with
are
carpoolers feel that their activities
Express Lanes alienable might make
for
opt
then
could
they
degree, since
valued by the state to an even greater
choice.
carpooling
their
of
as a result
either time or monetary savings
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Indeed, new users purchase their use right from the government, not

from existing users who are exiting the lanes. In this sense, the San
Diego freeway express lane example is more akin to a variable tax
scheme than to a marketable permit scheme. 20 1 No private party enjoys the opportunity to profit by transacting in express lane use
rights.2 0 2 In short, the system produces no opportunity for "winners"
to enjoy an economic profit.
In contrast, the case of punitive damages in the wake or absence
of corporate risk analyses is a setting where there are private party
winners. Automobile manufacturers may be viewed (at least after the
fact) as having profited at the expense of those injured or killed in
accidents. In short, the risk analysis setting seems much more hospitable to the commodification critique than does the freeway-express
lane setting. The setting of tradable pollution permits also can be
characterized to raise the specter of private party winners. Thus, it,
too, seems more susceptible to the commodification critique.
More importantly, the "commodity" that Strahilevitz studiedroadway usage-differs from the "commodity" of tradable permit systems-environmental degradation-in that roadway usage is not,
standing alone, seen to be a pure evil. By contrast, environmental
degradation-at least standing alone-is seen as a pure evil. There is,
in short, no partitioning of roadway usage from an underlying beneficial activity such that the commodification of roadway usage seems
problematic. (There might be more of a problem if, for example, the
government issued, instead of roadway usage permits, permits to emit
a certain amount of carbon monoxide which it then required drivers
to have before they get to operate their motor vehicles.)
In sum, framing effects do enhance the susceptibility of marketbased forms of environmental regulation to the "right to pollute" and
"commodification" critiques. In the next Part, I turn to the question
of whether, and if so how, the force of these critiques might be
blunted by altering the regulations' frames.

Id. at 1288 n.286.
201 See supra note 97.
202 Cf Levmore, supra note 39, at 114 (describing the basis of the "anti-cornmodification" objection to vote-selling as the "the idea that voting is a kind of collective decisionmaking experience, greater than the sum of individual votes, so that
something important is lost if an isolated voting right is sold for the individual seller's
selfish gain").
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V.

CRITIQUES OF MARKET-BASED
REFRAMING AS A MEANS TO DEFUSE
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

"right to pollute" and "cornIn the previous Part, I described the
environmental regulatory sysmodification" critiques of market-based
which market-based systems are
tems as effects of the frames through
are, to some degree at least,
portrayed. The fact that these critiques
those effects might be miniframing effects suggests that perhaps
that question in this Part.
mized by altering the frames. I address
is presented, and the efThe frame through which a regulation
either through education of the
fects of that frame, might be altered
natural frame, or by changing the
public to broaden the regulation's
Thus, one possibility is directly to
very frame of the regulation itself.
schemes are supposed to funcinstruct the public as to how these
the
they in fact do not compromise
20 4
tion, 20 3 and to demonstrate that
protection.
to environmental
government's commitment
the frame itself by changing the
Another avenue would be to alter
For example, tradable permit
nomenclature of market-based systems. create as emissions permits
they
systems generally refer to the rights
disclaim the property nature
often
or allowances. While the systems
2 5
the concern that the system is
of the allowances -in part to address6the fact remains that the alcreating "property rights to pollute"20
an absolute right to emit a certain
lowances' moniker connotes
20 7
amount of pollutant.
might be largely
531 (suggesting that the argument
203 See Nash, supra note 23, at
tradable pollu[the]
how
"explain[ ] to the public
defused by having the government
to function").
tion allowance regime is supposed
that society has
a tool is supported by the fact
as
education
of
204 The promise
that origirights
to new independent property
acclimated over time in other contexts
Property in
and
Time
See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander,
opposition.
significant
drew
nally
(describing
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 333-35 (1991)
the American Republican Legal Culture,
property in
intangible
of
forms
new
of
opposition,
the successful expansion, over
States).
United
the
and
Britain
Great
provides that
scheme in the Clean Air Act explicitly
to emit
205 For example, the statutory
authorization
"limited
a
only
constitutes
42
403(f),
a sulfur dioxide emission allowance
§
Act
Air
a property right." Clean
sulftir dioxide," and does "not constitute
U.S.C. § 765hb(f) (2000).
leeway were it to
this approach both to provide
206 Congress evidently adopted
the allowances, and
eliminate the rights conveyed by
decide in the future to modify or
"right to pollute."
a
conveying property interests in
to minimize the appearance of
73
at 584 n. .
Nash & Revesz, supra note 29,
not the current
that the current nomenclature-if
argue
207 Indeed, one might
emissions allowance
that a polluter who possesses an
state of the law itself-suggests
in no beneficial
engaged
pollutant even if the polluter was
could emit the amount of the
for no reason
pollutant
air
of
simply open a canister
activity, i.e., the polluter could
nomenclature
the
in
change
A
so.
authorized to do
other than that she was legally
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suggested that 2permits
0 8 PerTo address this problem, Carol Rose has
penalties."
"emissionS
or
debits"
"emissions
instead be dubbed
would be to
haps a more satisfying-and more effective-approach
to use the underlying propfocus the permit's moniker on the right
generation of pollution as a byerty in a way that results in the
retain the notion that the
product. 209 Such an approach would
beneficial activity, despite the
pollution emission ties back to some
from the underlying property
partitioning of the pollution "right"
the fact that other forms of
right. It also would serve to emphasize
pollution emissions against
environmental regulation also balance
engage in commodification.
beneficial activities, and thus themselves
framing effects to this
It is possible that, as a result of cumulative
developed and ensconced itself.
point, an anti-market-based norm has
or relabeling of programs will
If that is true, then simple education
objections to market-based reglikely not be successful in overcoming
efforts might be required to effect
ulation. More intense21educational
0
norm transformation.
CONCLUSION

different frames through
In this Article, I have argued that the
are presented may affect the
which different regulatory instruments
in turn may influence the choice
perception of those instruments, and
and
have used the "right to pollute"
among those instruments. Ithat
marketare typically lodged against
"commodification" critiques
as an example. The critiques
based environmental regulatory systems
regulatory tools, yet the percepin reality apply to most environmental
that three aspects of regulatory
tion is that they do not. I have argued
emphasis on individual actors as
framing-market-based regulations'
of pollution emissions
opposed to government, their partitioning
and their portrayal of polluters
from the underlying beneficial activity,
rights-contribute to this peras gaining, rather than surrendering,
(let
that such behavior would be tolerated
would dispel, properly, any suggestion
alone authorized).
208 Rose, supra note 99, at 36.
might be
perhaps too cumbersome, moniker
209 Thus, a more accurate, though
emission."
pollution
incidental
an
in
results
that
way
a
in
"permit to use property
of educa1730-31 (discussing the possible use
210 Cf Posner, supra note 104, at
"[n]o
because
that,
cf id. at 1734-35 (noting
tion to alter people's norms). But
to
going
are
commercials
television
amount of education and government-sponsored the answer instead was to "circumpollution,"
prevent paper mills from spewing forth
normthe air by "transform[ing] a firm's
polluting
against
norm"
"weak
the
vent"
on
traded
be
can
that
right
into a property
grounded entitlement to pollute 'a little'
the market").
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ception such that the perceived susceptibility of market-based instruments to these critiques is at least in part a framing effect. I have also
suggested some ways that the framing effects might be mitigated.
This Article provides three important lessons. First, at least some
of the objections to market-based environmental regulation result
from framing. Mitigation of these framing effects might make enactment of market-based regulation more politically viable.
Second, on a broader level, an understanding of the "commodification" critique of market-based environmental regulation as a framing effect suggests that perhaps other applications of that critique also
might result from framing. In this sense, framing effects may shed
light on the proper scope of "commodification," a scope that has
21
proven difficult to understand. '
Third, speaking even more broadly, the importance of framing
on environmental regulatory-instrument choice indicates that framing
effects may play an important role in instrument choice generally. Research into the breadth of such effects, as well as the degree to which
framing effects in fact may sway public opinion, would be worthwhile.

211 See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 39, at 115-16 & n.8; Note, The Price of Evelything,
the Value of Nothing: Refraning the Commodification Debate, 117 HARv. L. REV. 689 (2003).

